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ABSTRACT 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are playing a significant role in the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT).  Until recently, small UAS (SUAS) were an insignificant part of 
these efforts.  Now their numbers exceed those of their larger counterparts by an order of 
magnitude.  Future projections anticipate a growing demand for SUAS making now the 
best time to examine the functions they perform in order to make better decisions 
concerning their future design and development.  This thesis provides a brief history of 
UAS and discusses the current capabilities and mission areas in which they perform.  
Their relevance to modern warfare and assumptions concerning their future roles on the 
battlefield is presented.  Predominant UAS missions are identified, as well as the 
technical requirements deemed necessary for their success.  A generic UAS functional 
model is developed to illustrate where the challenges and technology gaps manifest in 
SUAS design.  Possible technology solutions that could fill these gaps are presented and 
a field experiment is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of several possible 
solutions.  The goal of this thesis is to identify existing technology gaps and offer 
technology solutions that lead to better design of future SUAS flight and mission control 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. MISSION STATEMENT 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are playing a significant role in the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT) and new missions are regularly generated for UAS as their 
capabilities continue to increase.  Small UAS (SUAS) are quickly taking on a larger role 
in the GWOT and this trend is expected to continue.  The capability of any given UAS 
determines the types of missions it can accomplish.  These missions vary widely from 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), precision target location, 
chemical/biological detection and measurement, force protection, combat search and 
rescue (CSAR), etc.  The U.S. government, and hence the American public will spend 
considerable amounts of money to advance and leverage the potential of all UAS.  In 
light of this, and the ever constrained budgets of the Department of Defense (DoD), 
developers and designers of UAS must strive to provide the most capability for the least 
amount of money, i.e., the most “bang-for-the-buck,” when these systems are ultimately 
implemented.   
The strengths and weaknesses of UAS are a function of numerous known and 
unknown parameters such as aerodynamics of the UAV itself, sensor performance, 
ground control station (GCS) user interface, operator skill, weather conditions, radio 
control signal quality, etc.  Knowledge of these strengths and weaknesses permits the 
development of technical requirements that enable UAS to effectively execute any given 
mission.  This thesis will take a high level look at SUAS.  An examination of the 
predominant missions and capabilities required in order to effectively execute those 
missions will be made followed by a discussion of the technical requirements needed to 
enhance the chances for mission success.  Challenges impeding or preventing SUAS 
from being as effective as possible, such as high cost or unproven technology, are 
addressed along with recommendations to mitigate their effects.  The goal of this thesis is 
to identify existing technology gaps and offer possible technology solutions that will aid 
the design of future flight and mission control support systems (FMCSS) for SUAS. 
This thesis consists of three parts.  The first, Chapters I and II, provides general 
background information on military UAS.  Historical achievements over the past 40 years 
2 
are highlighted and their current mission areas and capabilities are introduced.  The 
relevance of UAS in modern warfare is discussed including the growing significance that 
small UAS (SUAS) are playing in the GWOT.  Warfighter requirements for UAS, and 
the priorities they give to various missions is documented.  Part I also presents the 
assumptions made concerning future UAS development and the methodology followed in 
writing this thesis.   
The second part, Chapters III through V, starts with a discussion of the challenges 
facing modern SUAS.  Predominant UAS missions are presented in addition to the 
technical requirements deemed necessary for their success.  A matrix of UAS missions 
versus functions is presented as a segue into the final chapter that concludes with a 
generic SUAS functional model illustrating UAS subsystems and the functions they 
perform.  
Part three, Chapters VI through X, begins with a discussion of selected 
technology gaps that prevent SUAS from performing in an optimal fashion.  This is 
followed by a chapter that identifies possible current and future technologies that could 
be utilized to address these gaps.  Several possible technology solutions are investigated 
during a field experiment to demonstrate their feasibility.  The thesis concludes with 
lessons learned and recommendations for the design of future SUAS Flight and Mission 
Control Support Systems (FMCSS). 
B. BACKGROUND 
The military role of UAS is growing at unprecedented rates.  Within the last 
calendar year, tactical and theater level unmanned aircraft (UA) alone, had flown over 
100,000 flight hours in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).1  Rapid advances in technology are enabling more 
and more capability to be placed on smaller airframes which is spurring a large increase  
                                                 
1 Testimony of Mr. Dyke Weatherington, Deputy, UAS Planning Task Force, before the House of 




Figure 1.   DoD UAS Flight Hours (From: Office of Secretary of Defense) 
 
in the number of SUAS being deployed on the battlefield.  The use of SUAS in combat is 
so new that no formal DoD wide reporting procedures have been established to track 
SUAS flight hours.  As the capabilities grow for all types of UAS, nations continue to 
subsidize their research and development leading to further advances enabling them to 
perform a multitude of missions.  UAS no longer only perform intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, although this still remains their predominant mission.  
Their roles have expanded to areas including electronic attack (EA), strike missions, 
suppression and/or destruction of enemy air defense (SEAD/DEAD), network node or 
communications relay, combat search and rescue (CSAR), and derivations of these 
themes.  UAS range in cost from a few thousand dollars to tens of millions of dollars, and 
the aircraft used in these systems range in size from a Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) 
weighing less than one pound, to large aircraft weighing over 40,000 pounds. 
C.   UAS RELEVANCE 
The term “UAS” is relatively new and reflects the new perception given to a 
system that was once only thought of in terms of the unmanned vehicle itself.  During the 
1950s these “systems” were used as targets for other weapons, usually missiles, to shoot 
4 
at, and referred to as drones.  They were also being deployed as decoys with a boxy 
design in order to give them a radar cross section much like that of their B-52 mother 
ships.  Some were fitted with active radar reflection enhancement devices, as well as 
chaff and flare dispensers to further confuse enemy defenses.  These decoys were also 
equipped with an autopilot system that could be programmed for one change of speed and 
two turns.  The success of drones and decoys naturally led to more advanced missions.  In 
1959, Ryan Aeronautical began testing to evaluate the viability of using UAS for 
reconnaissance missions.  These efforts led to the deployment, in 1964, of an Air Force 
reconnaissance UAS called Lightning Bug to take pictures over China.  Two Lightning 
Bugs were launched from a DC-130 to fly over China and back to Taiwan where they 
would be recovered from a rice patty field after deployment of parachutes.  One of the 
Lightning Bugs failed to launch and the other one was badly damaged after splashdown 
when it was dragged over the ground by its parachute. The navigation of these unmanned 
aircraft was not as accurate as predicted, but the film payload was recovered intact and 
images of several primary targets were recovered.  Lightning Bugs were also used by the 
U.S. Navy over Vietnam to conduct reconnaissance missions.   
 
Figure 2.   Lightning Bug UAS (From: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) An Assessment 
Of Historical Operations And Future Possibilities; Maj. Christopher A. Jones, 
USAF; Air Command and Staff College, Research Paper, March 1997) 
 
After Vietnam, the use of UAS in the U.S. military rapidly declined.  It has taken 
over two decades for UAS to reemerge as a significant player in the U.S. military. 
However, recent battlefield successes have practically ensured their long term survival.  
During Desert Shield/Storm, the Pioneer, a derivative of an Israeli surveillance and 
reconnaissance UAS, played a crucial role for Army, Navy and Marine Corps battlefield 
5 
commanders.  They were so effective that Iraqi troops began to associate the sound of the 
UAV’s two-cycle engine with an imminent destructive bombardment.  UAS operations 




Figure 3.   Pioneer UAS 
 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), UAS have continued to play an important 
role becoming the most-requested capability among combatant commanders in Southwest 
Asia according to the deputy director of the Pentagon's UAS planning task force2.  In 
terms of raw numbers, there is an order of magnitude more small UAVs (SUAV) in the 
battlespace compared to the larger tactical and theater-level UAVs.  As of this writing, 
DoD has a force of over 2600 SUAVs and over 300 tactical and theater-level unmanned 
aircraft (UA) supporting military operations worldwide.3  The most prevalent UAS in the 
                                                 
2 Unmanned Aircraft Gain Starring Role in Terror War, News article by Donna Miles, American 
Forces Press Service, November 9, 2004. 
3 Testimony of Mr. Dyke Weatherington, Deputy, UAS Planning Task Force, before the House of 
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation; March 29, 
2006. 
6 
Iraqi theater is the SUAS called Raven.  It functions primarily as an intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance platform that provides warfighters real-time, over-the-
horizon views of trouble spots.  It is a hand-held system that packs into a transit case 
which can fit into the back of a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV).   
 
 
Figure 4.   Hand-Launching Raven  
 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
UAS will continue to be a major player in the current Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) and battlefield commanders will increasingly request their capabilities.  
Advances in materials technology and computer hardware and software will significantly 
increase the capabilities available in UAS.  Advances in microelectronics will particularly 
benefit SUAS since computer hardware components will become lighter permitting their 
installation on the smaller UAV platforms.  New software solutions will need to be 
developed to exploit the increasing capability made available by the new computer 
hardware components.  This rapid technology growth will accelerate government 
spending on UAS (Figure 5) and beg leadership to find ways to standardize components  
and operational procedures to keep these systems within affordable windows.  At some 
point the cost of SUAS may reach the point that the SUAV become an expendable part of 
the overall system. 
7 
 
Figure 5.   DoD Annual Funding Profile for UAS (From: UAS Roadmap, 2005) 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Research will be conducted on the existing literature that pertains to military 
UAS.  This research will uncover the most important and most probable missions that 
UAS are currently performing.  It will determine the most likely missions these systems 
will be called upon to perform in the future.  The capabilities required or desired to 
perform these missions will be discovered through literature review and interviews with 
subject matter experts (SME).  A mission versus functions matrix will be presented as a 
guide to ascertain the technology requirements necessary to effectively perform the most 
likely missions of UAS with an emphasis on missions performed by SUAS.  A “hands-
on” field experiment conducted at McMillan Airfield on Camp Roberts California 
National Guard Training Site to test a possible future SUAS technology is presented.  
Based on the research findings in this thesis, systems engineering methodology is applied 
to develop functional requirements from the mission needs that were documented in the 
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II. UAS MISSION AREAS AND PRIORITIES 
A. BACKGROUND 
UAS have proven their ability to be force multipliers—that is, devices that 
improve effectiveness in combat without requiring more forces or that enable 
commanders to accomplish missions with fewer forces.  History has validated the worth 
of UAS, large and small, in a variety of different roles.  This chapter will briefly examine 
the historical roles of UAS within the last 40 years in the U.S. military and then move on 
to examine the current capabilities and predominant missions that UAS provide today.  
COCOM requirements and priorities are also investigated as their input comes directly 
from the warfighters actually using UAS today.  Their experiences and feedback will 
provide the direction and focus needed to design the next generation flight and mission 
control support systems (FMCSS).   
B. HISTORICAL UAS MISSION AREAS 
There exists a strong correlation with past UAS missions and the missions 
currently being filled by UAS today.  Over the past 40 years, the Services have 
extensively utilized UAS to provide five variations of the intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) role.  This consistency indicates that the underlying requirements 
are long-term, and there is no reasonable reason to expect that this trend will cease.  
Table 1 illustrates the historically validated roles of UAS. 
 
Table 1. Historically Validated UAV Roles (From UAS Roadmap, 2005) 
 
10 
C. CURRENT UAS MISSION AREAS 
ISR utilizing electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR) and more recently, small aperture 
radar (SAR) sensors, have been the historically predominant roles or mission areas of 
UAS over the last 40 years.  The GWOT, however, has demonstrated the value of UAS in 
many other mission areas not strictly related to ISR.  Table 2 on the following page 
shows a list of 15 other mission areas, in addition to ISR, where UAS have flown in 
proof-of-concept demonstrations.  Notice that the list gives a demonstration of UAS 
based on whether the mission is “dull,” “dirty” and/or “dangerous.”  An example of a 
“dull” mission could be a very long ISR mission such as a no-fly zone patrol.  It is 
important to point out, however, that although the UAS sensors may be just as alert in the 
last hour of its patrol as it was in the first hour, this may not alleviate the dull aspect of 
the mission since a human operator may still be required to monitor and evaluate the 
incoming intelligence data.  The underlying assumption of good FMCSS design is that 
cognitive aids would be available to identify situations of interest that would help to 
mitigate the “dullness.”  “Dirty” missions (and also dangerous) could involve flights into 
airspace potentially contaminated with biological or chemical agents.  These areas would 
be avoided if possible, but if the mission was important enough, the UAV could operate 
in areas impossible for manned aircraft and either be decontaminated or discarded at 
mission completion.  An example of a “dangerous” mission, but not considered “dirty” is 
the electronic attack (EA) mission.  EA missions are often performed early in a battle 
while the enemy’s air defenses pose a serious threat.   
 
D. REQUIREMENT OF UAS 
Each year every COCOM submits an integrated priority list (IPL) of requirements 
identifying gaps in the warfighting capabilities within their Area of Responsibility 
(AOR).  At SECDEF direction, the latest list identifies capability gaps reflective of the 
five 2002 QDR-defined “operational risk” categories of battlespace awareness (BA), 
command and control (C2), focused logistics (FL), force application (FA), and force 
protection (FP)4.  The latest IPL, covering fiscal years 2006 through 2011, specifies 50 
gaps, 27 of which (54 percent) are currently, or could potentially be, addressed by UAS.   
                                                 
4 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, 4 August  2005, Office of the Secretary of 
11 
 
Table 2. UAS Mission Areas (From UAS Roadmap, 2005) 
                                                 
Defense, p. 43. 
12 
 
Table 3 from the 2005 Roadmap shows the COCOM priorities for the 27 capability gaps 
on a 1-8 priority scale.   
 









Table 3. IPL for UAS-Related Applications by COCOM 
 
Solid colored blocks indicate missions that UAS perform today and shaded blocks 
indicate functions that are under development.  It should be observed that every COCOM 
places UAS applications in the top half of his/her priority list.  Additionally, UAS 
applications are the #1 priority in five of nine COCOM including NORAD, and every 
mission currently performed by UAS (solid blocks) is listed within the top three priority.  
Clearly, UAS have been proving their value in modern warfare and will increasingly do 
so as their functionality improves.   
 
E. UAS MISSIONS 
1. Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (STAR) 
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (STAR) are by far the 
predominant missions of UAS today.  As mentioned in Chapter I, these missions date 
back to the Lightning Bug UAS used in 1964 over China and shortly thereafter in 
Vietnam.  STAR missions can be described in terms of three categories: “standoff,” when 
missions are conducted while recognizing the sovereign airspace of other countries; 
“overflight,” when missions are flown in the sovereign airspace of another nation, with or 
without consent, but at low risk to the mission; and finally, “denied,” which is similar to 
“overflight” except the nation-state being flown against possesses a credible capability to 
deny access to their territory5.  Strategic national assets such as satellites are also used for 
                                                 
5 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, 4 August  2005, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, p. A-2. 
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“denied” missions but they have the disadvantage of predictability.  UAS can augment 
satellites by showing up unwarned at unpredictable times allowing commanders to collect 
information when an adversary least expects it.   
Standoff missions are usually conducted during peacetime.  They are also used 
when the probability of vehicle loss or political ramifications are too great to risk the 
exposure of the UAV to detection.  To achieve the effect of persistence, the UAV must 
have the capability to remain on station for long periods of time.  Often broad areas need 
to be covered requiring high altitude flights with long range sensor performance.  In these 
cases, larger UAVs capable of long endurance and the ability to carry heavier payloads 
are needed.  These systems may be significantly hard pressed to collect weak 
electromagnetic signals or take high resolution photographs due to a large standoff 
distance.  In these cases SUAS can place sensors closer to the desired area of interest and 
thus increase chances of mission success may be the best option.  These missions 
essentially become that of an overflight mission discussed next. 
Overflight missions occur with or without the knowledge and/or consent of 
another state or entity being monitored.  Many overflight missions are being conducted 
today in both Afghanistan and Iraq in support of the GWOT.  The UAV may fly at high, 
medium or low altitudes depending on the particular situation.  If persistence is needed 
and image resolution or signal collection can be accomplished from high altitude, then a 
larger high altitude long endurance (HALE) platform such as the Global Hawk or 
Predator could be chosen.  If poor weather prevents operation from high or medium 
altitude then a SUAS could be utilized.  There is no particular standard platform to use 
when conducting overflight missions as there are for standoff and denied access missions. 
Denied access missions are generally used in support of combat operations or 
national security requirements.  In many cases satellites can be used, but as mentioned 
earlier, the disadvantage with satellites lay in their predictability.  An adversary can 
prevent data collection or deliberately deceive intelligence gatherers by placing targets or 
signals in the area of interest precisely when a satellite is scheduled to reconnoiter.  
Manned systems, most notably the U-2 and SR-71, and more recently the EP-3, have also 
been used for denied access missions.  The drawback with these platforms lie in their 
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potential risk of losing the aircrew and/or an expensive aircraft as well as the adverse 
political fallout that could result from its detection or capture.  UAS mitigate most of 
these concerns: they can arrive unwarned, have no crew to place in danger, are much less 
expensive than their manned counterpart and, being unmanned, they pose significantly 
less diplomatic consequences if captured.  The 2003 Defense Science Board and 2003 Air 
Force Scientific Advisory Board results both reported that a UAS capable of unwarned 
collection is needed by DoD. 
The idea of using SUAS for STAR missions, while not new, is still an emerging 
concept worthy of greater study.  Encouraging results have been achieved using SUAVs 
to collect against weak signals and to obtain high resolution images.  Definitive answers 
have not been determined to decide if multi-mission, versus dedicated mission, platform 
designs are the most cost effective approach for every application.  It is expected that 
opportunities which take advantage of growing commercial markets will yield the best 
value to DoD and ultimately to the taxpayers.   
2. Electronic Attack (EA) 
Electronic Attack (EA) is the use of electromagnetic (EM) energy to reduce the 
effectiveness of RADAR systems to allow flight of aircraft without harm from radars and 
associated missiles.  In this context, EA of an integrated air defense system (IADS) can 
be considered to be part of disruptive SEAD discussed in the next section.  EA can be 
achieved by either distracting a RADAR with confusing or deceptive information, or by 
blinding the RADAR making it unable to detect, track, engage, or destroy threats.6   
Only recently have UAS been used to conduct EA.  Prior to this, EA involved 
specially designed manned aircraft such as the Navy EA-6B Prowler and the Air Force 
EF-111 Raven.  Because UAS can achieve theoretically higher levels of survivability 
than manned aircraft, they offer a desirable alternative for conducting EA missions to 
manned aircraft.  SUAS are also well suited for EA attack missions due to their small 
size.  They are naturally stealthy making them less susceptible to detection and more 
likely to get close up to an adversary’s radar.  Current research is being conducted at NPS 
on a Morphing Micro Air and Land Vehicle (MMALV) that can fly and crawl up to a 
                                                 
6 Cooperative Electronic Attack using Unmanned Air Vehicles, Mark J. Mears, 2006, Air Force 
Research  Laboratory, Air Vehicles Directorate, Wright Patterson AFB 
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predetermined target (Figure 6).  Getting close to a radar antenna significantly reduces 
the amount of power required to interfere with the radar system.  Using UAS to perform 
EA missions will likely require more autonomy than most UAS currently have.  
Desirable capabilities would include the ability to operate and handle aircraft related and 
mission-related contingencies while unable to communicate with the MCS due to self-
jamming and beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) operations. 
 
Figure 6.   NPS MMALV (From: wingspan < 30.5cm, weight < 450g) 
 
3. Strike/SEAD 
On February 21, 2001 an Air Force Predator UAV made history by successfully 
aiming and launching a ‘live’ Hellfire-C, laser-guided missile that struck an unmanned, 
stationary Army tank on the ground at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Airfield near 
Nellis Air Force Base, NV.  Since then, the RQ-1 Predator has been modified to 
accomplish a ground attack role as well as reconnaissance and was redesignated the MQ-
1B Armed Predator.  On November 4, 2002 in Yemen, a Predator UAV was used to drop 
a Hellfire missile which destroyed a civilian vehicle carrying six suspected Al-Qaida 
terrorists one of whom was a key suspect in the October 2000 attack on the U.S. Navy 
destroyer Cole.  Due to the endurance and surveillance capability required to successfully 
carry out these missions, some have referred to such missions as a subset of the strike 
mission and have called it “armed reconnaissance.”  Either way, it is the strike capability 
that clearly differentiates these missions from others.  They provide an attractive 
alternative to manned aircraft because they eliminate the risk of the loss of an aircrew.   
Strike mission targets may be heavily or lightly defended and the level of the 
adversarial threat determines the characteristics most important in the UAS to carry out a 
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strike mission.  If the target is heavily defended, survivability is paramount.  The system 
design would trade payload and endurance characteristics for attributes that increase its 
probability of success against highly defended targets.  For targets less heavily defended,  
more emphasis would be justified on payload (sensors) and endurance which would lead 
to the most efficient “kill” capability.  Currently, no SUAS have been designed to carry 
out strike missions.   
SEAD missions can be either destructive or disruptive.  In military doctrine, 
destructive SEAD means destruction of the target in a permanent way and has the 
appropriate acronym DEAD for destruction of enemy air defense.  When the mission 
calls for neutralizing a radar temporarily, it is called disruptive SEAD.  Destructive 
SEAD missions could be considered a subset of a strike mission and disruptive SEAD 
missions could be considered a subset of the EA mission.  The characteristic that 
differentiates the SEAD mission from strike or EA is the target.   
SEAD are categorized as either pre-emptive or reactive.  Pre-emptive SEAD 
describes employment of the UAS prior to a strike aircraft’s arrival.  Its job is to suppress 
or destroy the enemy’s air defenses in order to protect the strike aircraft from surface to 
air attack.  Reactive SEAD missions involve the rapid suppression or destruction of 
enemy air defenses that become visible, or “pop-up,” during mission execution.  
Regardless of mission type, to be effective the UAV will have to “close-in” on the enemy 
threat.  Attributes of speed, maneuverability and stealth will be highly desired to enhance 
vehicle survivability.  Various design criteria deserve future study to determine the ideal 
combination of capabilities required for destructive SEAD missions. 
The 2005 UAS Roadmap has identified several characteristics that UAS 
accomplishing pre-emptive SEAD missions should have and are presented below.7 
• Extremely high mission reliability, as follow-on force assets (many of 
which will be manned) will depend upon the protection of a SEAD UA 
asset. 
• Battle damage assessment (BDA) so operational commanders can properly 
determine whether strike “go/no-go/continue” criteria have been met. 
                                                 
7 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, 4 August  2005, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, p. A-6. 
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• If BDA is organic this reduces the reliance on other systems 
outside the SEAD UA platform, but puts other design requirements 
on the SEAD UA that complicate signature control. 
• If BDA is not organic then this simplifies the SEAD UA design 
requirements, but complicates the integration of other ISR 
capabilities as a family of systems attempting to achieve effect in 
the SEAD mission. 
• Weapons optimized for concept of employment. If using direct attack 
munitions (short range), then a robust signature reduction design, or stand-
off weapons with appropriate support from on-board or off-board sensors 
to find, fix, track and target intended threats must be employed. 
• The use of direct attack munitions is a major cost avoidance compared to 
the integration and use of stand-off weapons. 
• However, stand-off weapons provide an opportunity to relax signature 
design requirements and thus avoid significant low-observable costs.  
Execution of the reactive SEAD mission implies further design criteria: 
• Enemy defensive systems’ operations must be detected rapidly implying 
an onboard capability to detect threats, or a well integrated system of 
systems. 
• Reaction time from detection to neutralization of the enemy defenses must 
be very short (seconds). 
• When using weapons to neutralize defenses, the flight time of the weapon 
must be reduced by the ability to stand in close to the target (high 
survivability) or by the use of a high-speed weapon. 
• Robust, anti-jam, data links are required. 
• Reactive SEAD will require low latency human interaction with the 
system – or high autonomy within the system for determination of ROE 
criteria. 
• Reactive SEAD implies the integration of manned and unmanned aircraft 
in a single strike event. 
4. Network Node/Communications Relay 
Multiple UAS have the ability to provide non-line-of-sight (NLOS) 
communication links to ground units, and thus have the ability to provide value to 
operational and tactical level commanders.  UAVs can act as flying network nodes with 
having the capacity to relay large quantities of data.  For example, it is possible using 
small (~8 in.) directional antennas, to exchange about 10 gigabits per second (Gbps) 
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between high-altitude UAVs and surface stations, over typical slant ranges, using only 1 
W of radiated power8.   
UAS conducting Network node/Communications Relay missions must be capable 
of flying at sufficient altitude in order to maintain a link for the duration of the mission.  
There must be sufficient redundancy built in to the system to provide continuous 
connectivity and the vehicle must be capable of generating adequate power, perhaps 
through the use of solar arrays, to provide the required data throughput capacity.  Radio 
line of sight (LOS) increases with sensor height i.e., aircraft altitude, as shown Figure 7 
below.  Medium and high altitude UAVs have the ability to fly above bad weather and 
maintain communication with each other while hundreds of miles apart.   
 
 
Figure 7.   Radio LOS vs. Altitude  (From: Miniature UAV’s & Future Electronic Warfare, 
Dr Anthony Finn, Dr Kim Brown, Dr Tony Lindsay; Technical Paper, October 
2002.) 
 
                                                 
8 Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations, The National Academies Press, 2005, p. 39. 
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Network node/communications relay missions are relatively new for UAS but 
rapid progress is being made in this area.  For example, in 2004, a long-endurance tactical 
UAV, the ScanEagle, successfully demonstrated the ability to relay high-speed wireless 
communications.  Streaming video and voice-over IP communication was sent from a 
GCS over a secure high-bandwidth network to the ScanEagle 18 miles away.  The data 
was then instantaneously relayed to ground personnel six miles from the UAV.9  Other 
development work underway includes trials to use Global Hawk, a HALE UAS, and 
Predator, a MAE UAV, as airborne communications nodes to shorten sensor to shooter 
timelines utilizing beyond line of sight connectivity.10  Due to the broad user base that 
could have access to network node/communications relay missions, the 2005 Roadmap 
predicts that any airborne communications node is likely to be a “Joint Program.”  It 
further states that the inclusion of legacy formats and architectures will be established in 
any approved requirements document and receive input from the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Network Integration.11 
 
                                                 
9 Boeing news release dated 21 December, 2004; accessed 29 May 2006 at 
http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2004/q4/nr_041221n.html 
10 Mission Applications and Concepts of Operations, R.A. Frampton, 2003. 
11 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, 4 August  2005, Office of the Secretary of 




Figure 8.   Communications Relay (From: Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Time-Sensitive 
Operations Joint Test and Evaluation Final Report, March 2005.) 
 
5. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 
Joint Publication 3-50.21 discusses joint tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TT&P) for combat search and rescue (CSAR) and defines CSAR as reporting, locating, 
identifying, recovering, and returning isolated personnel to the control of friendly forces 
in the face of actual or potential resistance.  CSAR missions can become complex 
requiring the coordination of multiple participants of different services and hence the 
planning for these missions is accomplished at the Joint Search and Rescue Center 
(JSRC) under the direction of the Joint Force Commander (JFC).  Integration of UAS 
into CSAR missions is so new (or Joint Pub 3-50.21 so old) that the Joint Publication 
does not even refer to UAS in their execution.   
In general, UAS performing CSAR missions perform tasks similar to those 
involved in STAR missions.  Their targeting capability is used to locate and provide the 
coordinates of the missing forces or indicate safe helicopter landing zones, parachute 
landing zones, or drop zones.  If the isolated personnel are equipped with man-pack 
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radios, the UAV, acting as a network node, could become a communication relay 
allowing the isolated personnel to communication with the JSRC.   
SUAS could be used for CSAR missions at the small unit level requiring little or 
no coordination with higher headquarters.  Their small size makes them difficult for the 
enemy to target and would not give away the friendly force’s location.  SUAS can help 
squad and platoon sized units search greater areas of terrain than would otherwise be 
possible in the same time with ground patrols.  Their “eyes in the sky” vantage point also 
makes it easier to locate wreckage that might be missed on foot.  In the future, it is 
expected that multiple SUAS operating in a coordinated net-centric environment will 
provide effective CSAR mission capability to commanders at both the tactical and 
operational levels.   
Operating SUAS for CSAR missions does present limitations.  SUAVs are limited 
by endurance and their lower altitudes may present larger acoustic and visual signatures 
making them susceptible to attack by man-portable air defense systems or otherwise 
alerting the enemy to friendly force locations.  It is worth noting, however, that detection 
of SUAVs is still not easy even when looking for them.  Discussion with operators and 
personal experience has revealed that it is difficult to hear SUAVs (gasoline or electric 
powered) even as low as 500 feet.  One operator reported that after hearing a SUAV—the 
electric powered CyberBug; it was very hard to detect with the naked eye at 500 feet, and 
virtually impossible to detect at 1000 feet.12  De-confliction issues should also be 
considered.  Larger UAVs, such as Predator or Hunter, fly at altitudes common to fixed-
wing aircraft; smaller UAVs, such as Raven and Dragon Eye, typically fly in rotary-wing 
airspace. 
 
F. MISSION PRIORITIES 
In 2004 the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked each COCOM and Service to rank the 
importance of 18 missions relative to four general classes of UAS, small, tactical, theater, 
and combat.  Their rankings were consolidated into a single chart and are provided in 
Table 4 below.  Of note in the chart is the fact that reconnaissance missions are the #1 
                                                 
12 Discussion with Ed Fisher concerning his experience with CyberBug operations during daylight 
operations in Thailand.   
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mission priority across all four classes of UAS.  Additionally, precision target location 
and designation missions are listed as the number two priority in all but one class of UAS 
(Theater) where it ranks as third.   
 
Table 4. 2004-COCOM/Service UAV Mission Prioritization  
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III. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
UAS, and in particular, SUAS are new technologies with vast potential that is just 
beginning to be discovered and exploited.  Reflective of technologies still under 
development and the limited recent use of SUAS in operational environments, many 
areas for improvement have been revealed.  This chapter will identify and investigate 
some important challenges to be addressed in designing future SUAS FMCSS.   
There is no shortage of challenges and problems that remain to be solved in the 
field of UAS.  This study could have narrowly focused on one particular problem or 
taken a very broad overarching view of UAS architecture.  In this chapter we stay 
somewhere in between by addressing three areas in enough detail to guide future SUAS 
FMCSS design, but not so technical as to get lost in the weeds.  The three broad areas to 
be examined are:   




B. VISUAL DISPLAY 
In the previous chapter we discovered that reconnaissance ranked as the most of 
important of 18 different types of missions that UAS either could or should perform.  For 
SUAS, the majority of the data provided in these missions is image data collected from 
electro-optical (EO) cameras.  The UAV flies within some distance of a potential target 
and collects visual data that is relayed to operators at the MCS.  Human operators are 
tasked with reviewing the visual data collected to determine if there exist targets of 
interest to be acted upon.  The quality of the video displayed directly affects the decisions 
operators make in the field.  Several challenges associated with visual data from EO 
sensors have been observed.   
• Time to detect target 
• Target geo-location 
• Image stability 
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• Narrow field of view (FOV) 
• Unknown search history  
1. Time to Detect Target 
As a UAV camera points to an area and collects optical information, this data is 
passed to the MCS in near real time (NRT).  An operator, therefore, must be able to view 
this data and make decisions based on his or her observation of the incoming visual data.  
As the rate of visual data flow increases, human operators find it harder to identify a 
given target of interest since the target remains in view for smaller amounts of time.  In 
one target detection experiment (Itti, Gold, and Koch, 2001), the participants were 
instructed to detect a target in a natural scene photograph; a task similar to UAV search 
task.  The average time required for target detection was 2.8 seconds.  When UAV 
operations lead to a high rate of video flow, the target may not remain visible on the 
monitor for 2.8 seconds.   
2. Target Geo-location 
Once a target has been detected, the next logical question to be asked is, “where is 
it?”  Target location in terms of geographical coordinates is an important capability for 
several military missions.  This functionality improves situational awareness (SA) and 
begins to turn raw data into actionable intelligence.  At least three missions identified in 
Chapter Two require the UAS to provide geo-located target coordinates.  For SUAS 
utilizing EO cameras, identifying the precise location of a target with geographical 
coordinates is not trivial.   
3. Image Stability 
Unstable imagery is a problem with SUAS due to the “bounce” encountered with 
air turbulence.  During SUAS experiments at Camp Roberts, California, observers noted 
large oscillations of the video frame displayed at the ground control station (GCS) at a 
frequency of approximately 2-4 oscillations per second.  For example, if an object were at 
the top of the monitor image, it would go near, or off, the bottom of the monitor image 
several times per second.13  
 
                                                 
13 Human Systems Integration and Automation Issues in Small Unmanned Air Vehicles; Michael E. 
McCauley, Panagiotis Matsangas; p. 10; October 2004. 
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4. Narrow Field of View (FOV) 
The FOV is the amount of a given scene captured by the camera and is 
completely dependent upon the type of camera being used aboard the UAV.  A narrow 
FOV provides a much smaller picture than that normally be seen by a human with his or 
her own eyes and is appropriately described as looking through a soda straw.  As the 
FOV increases, operators obtain greater context of the area of interest, but it becomes 
more difficult to identify individual targets due to loss of resolution.  Cameras with zoom 
capability allow the mission payload operator (MPO) to change the FOV during mission 
performance.  Other cameras may have the capability to pan and tilt allowing operators to 
“point” the camera in any direction within the limits of the camera.  This functionality 
gives operators the flexibility of looking in directions not completely determined by the 
UAV flight path, but pan and tilt do not change the size of the FOV.   
5. Unknown Search History 
On most SUAS, the air vehicle operator (AVO) controls the vehicle’s flight path 
while another operator, the MPO, controls and monitors the optical data returned.  While 
most missions have automated flight paths following a given set of waypoints to direct 
the UAV, most systems have no automated mechanism to ensure that all areas of interest 
have been observed.  Areas within the camera’s FOV can be obstructed by hills, trees and 
buildings that block observation of the areas behind it.   
 
B. POOR INTEROPERABILITY  
A simple definition was put forth by the Committee on Autonomous Vehicles in 
Support of Naval Operations in their 2005 report to the Navy:  Systems are interoperable 
if users can easily and confidently make them work together in reasonable combinations 
that have never been tried before.  A counter example of this occurred during set up for 
the field experiment which will be described in Chapter VIII.  The experiment called for 
receiving live video data from two Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) designed SUAVs.  
When difficulty was encountered getting one of the vehicles airborne, operators 
attempted to receive data from a different SUAS called Raven.  It was quickly discovered 
that the data format used by the Raven was incompatible with the application program 
being used for the experiment and therefore the Raven’s video feed could not be used.   
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 Interoperability difficulties such as this will rise with the growing number of 
UAS in use throughout DoD, the civilian community at large and our allies around the 
world.  Most of the UAS in development today are being designed as stand alone units.  
Airframes, autopilots, communication, payload processing, and integration with the 
larger command and control structures are being designed on a case by case basis with 
little attention devoted to ensuring they are designed with Joint/Combined 
interoperability requirements in mind.  With each different UAS that participates in a 
military operation, it becomes harder to manage and coordinate air combat operations 
because each system will have its own unique software and MCS.  
 
C. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT   
Operational support is a broad area that can not (and should not) be neglected 
when designing UAS.  Operational support considers the requirements for manpower, 
training and logistics throughout the lifecycle of the UAS.  In most DoD acquisitions, 
operational support costs easily top those of other categories such as research and 
development, procurement and construction costs.  Some estimates place operations and 
support costs between 70 to 80 percent of the total life cycle costs of an acquisition 
system.14  This challenge can be mitigated upfront by considering these issues during 
UAS design and development.   
                                                 
14 Article from Defense AT&L Magazine by, Cosmo Calobrisi entitled Meaningful Metrics for Total 
Life Cycle Costs, May-June 2006 issue. 
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IV. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MISSION SUCCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The military, government agencies and commercial companies are spending 
millions of dollars to rigorously explore the best capabilities and/or systems to pursue.  A 
good systems engineering approach is needed to help integrate these developments with 
other capabilities and systems that will lead to the best value for the organization and 
ultimately the taxpayers.  The current expectation assumes best value will result in 
recommendations that encourage modular designs which will enable plug-and-play 
functionality between components.  Additionally, this design should fit well within the 
larger context the Global Information Grid to enable net-centric warfare.   
This chapter will outline the primary missions performed by UAS today and those 
missions that are expected to be performed in the near future.  The technical functions 
required to allow these missions to be successful will be discussed and a mission-versus-
function matrix is presented to show what functions are, or will be, required for specific 
UAS missions.  The matrix will form the cornerstone on which to design a FMCSS.   
The primary missions that UAS currently perform are those involving ISR.  These 
missions have proven their value to battlefield commanders by providing enhanced 
detection, identification, tracking, and reconnaissance of contacts in an AOI. Depending 
upon the specific system, UAS are capable of searching, collecting, locating, processing, 
updating, and delivering data to decision makers at all levels within the command and 
control structure with the goal of improving situational awareness (SA).  SUAS are less 
capable than larger systems due to limited payload capacity and smaller processing 
power, but in general, employment of all UAS share the following objectives: 
a. Maximize sensor coverage 
b. Maximize likelihood of detecting targets of interest 
c. Minimize the time between detection and identification 
d. Minimize uncertainty regarding target location and movement 
e. Minimize time latency between UAS data collection and incorporation 
into SA 
f. Maximize collection of priority intelligence requirements 
28 
UAS are well suited to provide the capabilities needed to perform ISR missions 
where manned aircraft were once required.  They can conduct the so-called “dull, dirty 
and dangerous missions” when limited numbers of manned assets are available or when 
circumstances present unacceptable levels of risk to personnel.  For example, UAS are 
finding increasing roles in the area of border security where it is desirable to limit 
demands on aircrews and more expensive manned aircraft.  In hostile environments with 
high threat due to shoulder launched weapons, SUAS are a viable replacement for 
manned helicopters due to their minimal radar cross-section and insignificant heat 
signature.  UAS offer an alternative to ground commanders with force protection 
missions by employing a UAS in place of ground combat patrols to provide early 
warning of possible threats.  UAS can provide battle damage assessment information that 
would otherwise require manned aircraft or satellite resources.  In a maritime 
environment UAS can provide surveillance of vessels being boarded during maritime 
interdiction operations (MIO).    
 
B. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 
Given the overwhelming priority placed on the STAR mission, this section will 
discuss the technical requirements needed of SUAS in order to effectively accomplish 
STAR missions.   
1. Visual Display 
The visual display is the primary means of receiving information about the 
environment in which the SUAS operates.  Key parameters associated with visual display 
are: Time to detect target, image stability, field of view (FOV), target geo-location and 
search history.  These parameters will be discussed in the following section.   
Figure 9 is a representation of the time available to the MPO to detect a target 
from the visual scene as a function of altitude and speed.  
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Figure 9.   Time of available to detect a target (From: Human Systems Integration and 
Automation Issues in Small Unmanned Air Vehicles; Michael E. McCauley, 
Panagiotis Matsangas; p. 9; October 2004) 
 
The assumptions underlying the model are:  
• The UAV is flying at constant speed over ground (in [km/hour]) and 
height (in [ft]). Typical air speed for existing SUAVs is in the 80 to 100 
km/hr range.  
• The camera is stabilized.  
• The target is stationary.  
• There are no lags, or other errors.  
• The FOV (30°) of the camera corresponds to a typical value found in 
existing SUAS.  
It can be seen that higher altitudes and slower speeds provide the operator more 
time to detect a target.  Only altitudes over 500 feet will provide greater than 2.8 seconds 
to recognize a target.  
a. Time to Detect Target   
In this sense we take into account the time an operator, presumably the 
MPO, takes to identify a possible target from an EO/IR feed originating from a SUAS.  
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For STAR missions, until a target is identified, the only intelligence gathered is that no 
target exists within the area of interest.  In some cases this is the desired state and no 
further follow on action is required.  However, for most missions including strike, EA, or 
CSAR, a target should be identified quickly in order that the next phase of the mission 
may commence.  Target identification is required in virtually every UAS mission with the 
exception of the communications relay mission.   
In Chapter III experimental results showed that it took approximately 2.8 
seconds to detect a target in a natural scene photograph.  The experiment made 
assumptions that will not always hold true for real world missions such as stabilized 
cameras and stationary and unobstructed targets.  It would be interesting to know how 
long it takes, on average, to detect real targets in dynamic environments with varying 
degrees of cover and concealment and with differing camera capabilities.  This is an area 
that deserves future research that could guide designers in choosing the optimal sensor 
for a given mission under various operational environments.   
From a command and control (C2) perspective, as target information is 
passed up the chain of command and distributed to friendly units throughout the AOR, 
they are empowered with greater SA.  Their enhanced SA gives decision makers a C2 
advantage over potential adversaries and leads to faster and better decisions.  The time 
required to collect and deliver this information up the chain of command is inversely 
proportional to mission effectiveness.  The quicker a target can be identified, the faster 
the next phase of the mission can begin, thereby denying adversaries time they would 
otherwise have to thwart friendly plans.   
Examples of important information that can be collected from SUAS 
equipped with EO/IR sensors includes: 
• Target Location (within context of visual display) 
• Target Activity 
• Target Size 





b. Target Geo-location 
Target geo-location was identified as a desired capability for three 
missions in Table 6.  The effectiveness of STAR, Strike/SEAD, and CSAR all depend, to 
some extent, on the ability of the UAS to geo-locate a target of interest.  STAR missions 
should provide target coordinates of enemy units which are then fed to friendly forces 
who utilize this information to carry out a strike mission.  Obviously these strike missions 
require very accurate target positioning lest a GPS guided weapon, such as JDAM, could 
miss its intended target resulting in fratricide or collateral damage.   
c. Image Stability 
Image stabilization is a problem with SUAS due to the “bounce” 
encountered with air turbulence.  If a zoom lens is used, image stability gets worse when 
zooming on an area or target of interest.  Additionally, for cameras equipped with pan 
and/or tilt capability, the MPO will attempt to keep the target within line-of-sight (LOS) 
as the target moves and this usually results in further video display oscillations.   
Ideally, a camera will stay focused on a potential target and remain 
immune to UAV fluctuations.  For most SUAS, such as the prolific RQ-11 Raven 
currently used in Iraq and Afghanistan, the sensor payload (EO and IR cameras) is an 
integral part of the airframe and can not be moved.  This design contains no form of 
mechanical stability making the returned images completely susceptible to aircraft 
“bounce.”  For other SUAS with gimbaled cameras providing pan and tilt capability, 
payload restrictions make it difficult to incorporate more massive inertially stabilized 
systems that are found on larger UAS.  A possible solution to the SUAS image stability 
problem involves using software in lieu of hardware.  Software algorithms that can be 
integrated within existing SUAS, at the vehicle or GCS level, may be a potential solution 
to reduce the instability of images viewed by operators.   
c. Enhanced Field of View (FOV)  
As mentioned in Chapter II, the FOV is the amount of a given scene 
captured by the camera and is completely dependent upon the type of camera being used 
aboard the UAV.  For UAS equipped with cameras having zoom capability, MPOs can 
change the FOV provided.  STAR missions orient on the location or movement of the 
reconnaissance objective.  Objectives may be stationary such as terrain features or a 
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general locality, or a mobile enemy force.  Often when reconnoitering, the MPO will see 
a potential target and need to “zoom-in” (increase zoom angle) to gain better a look.  As 
the operator “zooms-in,” target resolution will increase, but FOV will decrease.  This 
smaller FOV removes context that was previously available when using a smaller zoom 
angle.  The smaller FOV also makes the visual display appear to be shakier and less 
stable as discussed above.  A capability that provides context while providing resolution 
is needed to enhance UAS mission effectiveness. 
d. Search History 
During field experiments at Camp Roberts, a great deal of coordination 
between the AVO and MPO was required to perform missions involving target 
recognition.  If the MPO thought he saw something important, he would inform the AVO 
who would take manual control of the UAV in order to get a “better look.”  It was 
observed that the operators often had difficulty finding the location of interest and 
determining what areas had previously been searched.  A technology that permits instant 
video replay of areas previously surveyed could significantly improve operator 
performance and mission effectiveness.  Ideally, this capability should be available to the 
MPO and AVO in real time.  Interesting images could be saved locally and sent later to 
other consumers.  It may also be possible to use saved imagery to update terrain 
databases or a digital map based common operational picture (COP).   
2. Interoperability 
Besides the technical requirements described above for STAR mission success, it 
is also important that UAS developers to consider how their designs impact other systems 
and how well they can interoperate with these other systems.  In 2003 the National 
Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) C4ISR Division together with major UAS 
industry leaders including Boeing, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Lockheed 
Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon completed a study that addressed common and 
standard UAS “plug-and-play architectures” that would allow multiple unmanned 
aircraft, sensors, and mission control ground stations to work in a common network.  The 
study said it had “not found anyone in the UAV industry who is moving toward 
architecture commonality.”15  It called for DoD to enforce compliance with common 
                                                 
15 UAV Programs Need Common Standards, Says Industry Study, Sandra I. Erwin, National Defense 
Magazine, October 2003. 
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standards and warned that while a universal architecture is achievable, it must be 
managed properly. 
In a July 2004 interview with National Defense Magazine, Dyke Weatherington, 
the deputy of the UAV planning task force at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
acknowledged that “…in the next two or three years, you’ll see some air vehicle 
interfaces…and the focus should be on defining a standard air vehicle interface for small 
UAVs because of the ease of receiving data from them, the large number of potential 
users and the airspace issues that could arise from hordes of organic squad-level 
UAVs.”16  He noted that different classes (i.e. sizes) of UAVs would have similar, but 
not identical interfaces.  SUAS, for example, would not likely carry weapons and 
therefore not be in need of a weapons interface.  Additionally, he envisioned that 
interfaces for the SUAS would be designed to work on control stations such as laptops 
and PDAs likely to be found at the small unit level.  This prediction is slowly becoming a 
reality as many of the new SUAS being developed utilize laptop computers or handheld 
PDA-like devices to control the UAV and payload.   
At the international level, UAS are currently produced by 14 of the 26 member 
states of NATO.  This fact further underscores the importance of conforming to standards 
in order to optimize battlefield effectiveness in ever increasing multi-national operations.  
Recognizing the importance of interoperability, NATO has written Standard Agreement 
(STANAG) 4856 to address standard interfaces of UAS control systems.  In its second 
edition, STANAG 4586 was conceptualized to promote interoperability between UAS to 
include one or more GCS, UAVs and their payloads, and the Command, Control, 
Communication, Computer and Intelligence (C4I) network, particularly in joint 
operational settings.17  In an effort to align itself with this standard, The U.S. Navy has 
been developing the Tactical Control System (TCS) in order to provide a single product 
for the control of UAVs from the different manufacturers.  The Army has developed its 
own common GCS called the One System station for use with Shadow, Hunter and 
Predator UAS which will also be compliant with STANAG 4856.  The Marine Corps and 
                                                 
16 Pentagon Setting Guidelines For Aircraft Interoperability, Michael Peck, National Defense 
Magazine, July 2004. 
17 Human Performance considerations in the Development of Interoperability Standards for UAV 
Interfaces, M.L. Cummings, J.T. Platts, A. Sulmistras, 2006.   
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Air Force are conducting bi-monthly meetings with their Army-Navy counterparts to 
ensure their UAS procurements are interoperable with those of the Army and Navy and 
therefore compliant with the NATO standard.  
3. Operational Support 
a. Manpower 
Currently, UAS crews consist of operators based on the functional areas 
they control such as mission payload operator (MPO), air vehicle operator (AVO), 
communications officer, weapons release authority (for Unmanned Combat Aerial 
Vehicles (UCAVs)), and a mission commander. Applications to reduce these functional 
manpower positions into fewer positions are just beginning to be considered.  Compared 
to manned aircraft, UAS have the potential to significantly reduce these costs.  Savings 
will be achieved when functional manpower positions are reduced or more UAVs can be 
adequately controlled by the same positions.   
To realize these savings, UAS must become more autonomous, that is, 
capable of performing functions in flight that are currently performed by human operators 
at the MCS.  A key challenge being addressed is how the operator interacts with the 
aircraft under normal operations and when an emergency develops.  Interfaces must be 
designed to allow the operator to understand what is going on at a glance so that adequate 
time is available to handle both normal and emergency situations as they develop.   
The Army currently has four different types of UAS to conduct 
operations: the RQ-1L I-Gnat which was recently upgraded with a turbocharged engine to 
extend its operating altitude to 30,500 feet, the RQ-5/MQ-5 Hunter and RQ-7 Shadow 
which are considered tactical UAS (TUAS); and the RQ-11 Raven, a SUAS.  To get a 
quick look at the manpower required to operate these individual systems, a “best case” 
“human-to-UAV” ratio is calculated by assuming all UAVs are airborne at one time.   
• The Hunter has 48 military and 5 contractor personnel to operate six 
UAVs for a “human-to-UAV” ratio of 8.8:1.   
• The Shadow UAS consists of four UAVs with 22 military and 2 contractor 
personnel giving it a ratio of 6:1.   
• The I-Gnat organization is made up entirely of contractor personnel 
(normally 10) and contains three UAVs for a ratio of 3.3:1.   
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• Lastly, the Raven SUAS has the best “human-to-UAV” ratio with only 
two operators and three UAVs for a ratio of only 0.7:1.   
Current UAS operations however, normally do not involve all aircraft in 
the system to be flying simultaneously.  Despite having the capability to operate multiple 
UAVs per system simultaneously, the limited number of communication frequencies 
available often restricts the number to one UAV airborne at a time.  Assuming only one 
UAV is flying at any given time yields “worst case” ratios of 53:1, 24:1, 10:1 and 2:1 for 
Hunter, Shadow, I-Gnat and Raven respectively.   
b. Training 
Most DoD UAS operating today employ contractors to conduct the 
majority of their UAS training requirements.  This can be attributed to the fast pace at 
which UAS are being developed and underscores the lack of interoperability among the 
wide variety of UAS in the field.  Until unmanned aviation becomes standardized within 
the services, the use of civilian contracted trainers will need to continue.  For those UAS 
that require unique and costly maintenance, the use of contractors may prove a better 
option than training military personnel.  The status of training for the individual U.S. 
military services is provided in the 2005 Roadmap and reproduced in Table 5 below.  
With the exception of the Army's Hunter and Shadow training programs, each UAS has a 
dedicated training program with the students in these courses ranging from experienced 
rated officers as pilots to recent enlistees as airframe maintainers. 
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Table 5. Status of Training (From: UAS Roadmap, 2005) 
 
c. Identified Training Challenges 
The 2005 Roadmap has identified four distinct training issues and goals to 
be pursued:18 
• Although a spiral acquisition approach is favored for most UAS programs, 
it imposes an unrecognized burden for UAS trainers: always being one or 
more steps out of phase with the capabilities being incrementally fielded. 
This requires additional training (i.e., cost) at the unit level after the 
student completes initial training. 
• Current ground stations are not designed to be dual capable for use in both 
controlling actual missions and conducting simulated flights for training. 
                                                 
18 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, 4 August  2005, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, pp. 63-64. 
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This drives added product support costs for dedicated simulators and task 
trainers by requiring more numerous and higher fidelity simulators and 
trainers. 
• The current and projected OPTEMPO associated with the Global War On 
Terrorism (GWOT) does not allow systems to be taken off-line for 
extended periods of time in order to implement hardware and software 
improvements and to train operators on the new capabilities.  
• Most UAS maintenance training lacks dedicated maintenance trainers as 
well as digital technical orders and manuals with embedded refresher 
training. This results in factory representatives having to be fielded at most 
UAS operating sites and to deploy to war zones to compensate for 
inadequate training. 
 
E. FUNCTIONS-VS- MISSIONS 
This chapter is concluded with a table showing UAS missions versus the 
functions or capabilities required to successfully accomplish the mission.  The table has 
an additional column that identifies the particular UAS subsystem associated with the 
given function and will be elaborated on in Chapter VII.  For now, the intent of Table 6 is 
to provide designers a list of the functional capabilities needed to effectively perform the 
most likely missions that current and future UAS will conduct.   
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Vehicle Propulsion X X X X X
Vehicle Electrical Power X X X X X
Vehicle Vehicle Systems Monitor X X X X X
Vehicle Vehicle Control And Stablization X X X X X
Vehicle Autopilot / Homing X X X X X
Sensor/Weapon Sensor Measurement And Control X X X X
Sensor/Weapon Weapon Measurement And Control X
MCS Fly-The-Sensor X X X X X
MCS Communications Link Monitor X X X X X
MCS Operator / Flight Control X X X X X
MCS Flight Pattern Execution X X X X X
MCS De-Confliction X X X X X
MCS Battlefield SA Update X X X X X
MCS Tactical Mission Planning X X X X X
MCS Multi-UAV Coordination X X X X X
MCS Sensor Commands X X X X
MCS Flight And Airspace Planning X X X X
MCS Known Search History X X X X
MCS Commander'S Intent X X X X
MCS Rehearsal X X X X
MCS Image Stabilization X X X
MCS Target Geo-Location X X X
MCS Multiple Target Tracking X X X
MCS After Action Report (AAR) X X X
MCS Target Assignment X X X
MCS Strategic Mission Planning X X
MCS Real Time Video Target Tracking X X
MCS ROE X
Communication Flight Control Link UAV to GCS X X X X X
Communication Sensor Control Link UAV to GCS X X X X X
Communication Link Between GCS and MCS X X X X X
Communication Link Between MCS and Other Consumers X X X X X
Support UAS Storage X X X X X
Support Deployment / Delivery X X X X X
Support Maintenance X X X X X
Support Logistics Re-Supply X X X X X
MISSIONS
 
Table 6. Functions vs. Missions 
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V. GENERIC UAS SYSTEM DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A large number of UAS are being developed and much of this development is 
driven by economic considerations.  Governments, and particularly their militaries, 
understand the cost savings they can realize by implementing UAS systems into areas 
traditionally held by piloted aircraft.  The American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (AIAA) lists hundreds of UAS either under development or in production 
worldwide as of July 2005.  Design of UAS should seek to identify and standardize the 
functions required to accomplish UAS missions and make the components as 
interoperable and potentially plug and play compatible as possible.  This standardization 
will lead to more affordable systems without sacrificing capability. 
In this chapter the basic concept and design of a generic UAS is discussed.  For 
practical purposes, there is little difference between this generic model and that of a 
SUAS and therefore the model applies equally to both.   
B. BASIC CONCEPT OF AN UAS 
 
Figure 10.   UAS Concept (From: Fundamental “UAV” Concepts and Technological Issues, 
Uwe K. Krogmann, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Research And 
Technology Organisation, RTO-EN-025 AC/323(SCI-109)TP/41) 
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Figure 10 on the previous page illustrates the basic concept of an UAS.  Although 
the aircraft is unmanned, the system is not.  Human operation is central to the flexible 
control of every UAS.  If properly equipped, the operator can exploit information not 
only from onboard UAV sensors, but also information from offboard sensors such as 
other UAS or ground units or even information from databases inside and outside the 
AOR.  The control station could be located anywhere, i.e., on the ground, at sea, or in the 
air or space.  The important goal of modern UAS is to put an operator’s brain in the 
cockpit while leaving his/her body on the ground.  With this human in the loop (HIL) 
operation, the UAS contains the rational, judgmental, and moral qualities of a person and 
enables the system to be operated over a diverse and dynamic set of conditions and 
missions.   
 
C. UAS FUNCTIONAL SUBSYSTEMS 
The UAS, and indeed all systems, consist of subsystems that are assembled 
together in such a way that they are capable of performing functions that the individual 
subsystems would be unable to accomplish alone.  Subsystems are individual and distinct 
units within the system capable of performing their own unique functions.  These 
subsystems consist of components that may be located close together or far apart.  
Regardless of their location, the designer must integrate these subsystems and 
components into a complete system, the UAS, that enables an aircraft with its onboard 
sensors and offboard MCS to perform a wide range of missions without the physical 
presence of a pilot in the aircraft.   
In broad terms, a typical UAS can be broken down into five major functional 
subsystems as shown in Figure 11.  These subsystems provide all the functional 
capabilities for the UAS that were listed in Table 6.  Some of the functions are performed 
within multiple subsystems and, therefore, no perfect one-to-one correlation between 
functions and subsystems exists.  The table, however, provides a point of reference to 
enable understanding of where in a typical UAS these functions reside.  This section 













Figure 11.   UAS Functional Subsystems 
 
1. Vehicle Subsystem  
The vehicle subsystem consists of the aircraft and the components related to its 
management and control.  Major components within the vehicle subsystem could include 
the engine, alternator (generator), landing/takeoff gear, autopilot, avionics, etc.  The 
vehicle subsystem provides the following functionality listed in Table 7: 
 
Propulsion Vehicle Control and Stablization 
Electrical Power Auto-reflex / Stabilization  
Vehicle Systems Monitor Autopilot / Homing 
 
Table 7. Vehicle Subsystem Functionality 
 
2. Mission Control Station Subsystem 
The mission control station (MCS) is a generic term used to describe the people 
and components involved with mission planning and flight control.  The MCS often 
consists of two parts, one located close to UAV operations which is referred to as the 
ground control station (GCS), and another station that handles the higher level mission 
planning and battlespace awareness issues such as a theater level command and control 
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headquarters or a smaller tactical operations center (TOC).  For simplicity, we refer to 
either component as the MCS.  Most of the functional capability of an UAS resides in the 
MCS subsystem.  Table 6 lists 21 unique functions performed within this subsystem.  
Conceptually, the MCS subsystem contains the “brains” of every mission and provides 
for the command and control (C2).  The MCS subsystem could be physically located on 
the ground, at sea, or in the air.  It could also consist of more than one station to increase 
reliability, for example, in a network-centric organization that has multiple MCS 
networked together.  If one station is destroyed or otherwise loses communications with 
the vehicle, the other MCS would take over where the first left off.  Often, some MCS 
function are delegated to a “lower level” MCS such as a local GCS.  The GCS mentioned 
earlier, is usually responsible for “flying” the UAV and sending data back to a higher 
level MCS that is responsible for transforming the raw data received into actionable 
intelligence (information). 
 
Operator / Flight Control Tactical Mission Planning Waypoint Command Generation
Real Time Video Target TrackingRehearsal Flight And Airspace Planning 
Image Stabilization Seach Pattern Generation After Action Report 
Flight Pattern Execution Target Id And Location Communications Link Monitor 
Local De-Confliction Close To Real-Time TrackingStrategic Mission Planning 
Multi-UAV Coordination Battlefield SA Update Commander's Intent 
Sensor Commands Fly-The-Sensor Target Assignment 
 
Table 8. Mission Control Station Subsystem Functionality 
 
3. Sensor/Weapon Subsystem  
The sensor/weapon subsystem contains the components that sense or effect the 
environment.  This subsystem can be broken into other distinct subsystems as the 
complexity increases.  While somewhat simple when described at high level, the sensor 
or weapon components themselves can be very complex and constitute a significant 
fraction of the total UAS cost.  The majority of SUAS are unarmed, and predominantly 
perform STAR missions; therefore, the weapon subsystem is not applicable to SUAS 
operation.  Because the sensor(s) is attached to the air vehicle, operators normally think 
first in terms of flying the UAV to the AOI.  Once the UAV reachs the AOI, efforts are 
shifted to positioning or aiming the sensor at a potential target.  With the target within the 
sensor’s FOV, the product--video data for example, can be transmitted back to the MCS 
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and distributed.  Common sensors aboard a SUAV include EO/IR cameras and GPS.  
Functionality of the sensor / weapon subsystem include: 
 
Sensor Measurement And Control 
Weapon Measurement And Control 
 
Table 9. Sensor/Weapon Subsystem Functionality 
 
5. Communication Subsystem 
The communications subsystem consists of components located throughout the 
UAS and supports communication at any level within the bigger system.  For example, 
part of the communication subsystem provides the video link between a camera and the 
MPO and consists of the radio transmitter aboard the UAV and the receiver located at the 
GCS.  Another part of the communication subsystem may pass data between a platoon or 
squad level GCS located near the forward line of troops (FLOT) and a battalion tactical 
operation center (TOC).   
Without the communication subsystem it would be impossible to create the virtual 
pilot by putting his or her brain in the cockpit as discussed earlier.  For SUAS, 
communication is accomplished through an RF line of site (LOS) link between the 
aircraft and operators.  Larger UAS may have multiple links including satellites that 
significantly extend the distance between operator and UAV.  Problems with the 
communication subsystem such as loss of link, will usually significantly impact mission 
performance.  If the communication link is lost (worst case) for example, most missions 
will have to be aborted since the majority of UAS lack the autonomy required to 
effectively execute important missions without a human-in-the-loop (HIL).  Latency is 
another common communication link problem that may prevent remote operators from 
controlling the UAV in real time.  The latency issue requires local operators within LOS 
to perform take-off and landing maneuvers that can not tolerate the time delays 





Communication Flight Control Link UAV to GCS 
Communication Sensor Control Link UAV to GCS 
Communication Link Between GCS and MCS 
Communication Link Between MCS and Other Consumers 
 
Table 10. Communication Subsystem Functionality 
 
5. Support Subsystem 
As UAS operations continue to grow, they become more dependent upon robust 
service and support organizations that can remain responsive to their increasing needs.  
Planning, managing, and executing supply support and maintenance involves 
synchronized coordination at many levels to ensure seamless integration.  Logistics and 
maintenance should never be overlooked when designing a UAS as most of the total life 
cycle costs are traceable to these functions.  Some of the key functions associated with 
the support subsystem include: 
 
Uas Storage Maintenance 
Deployment / Delivery Logistics Re-Supply 
 
Table 11. Support Subsystem Functionality 
 
D. UAS FUNCTIONAL LAYER MODEL 
Another descriptive way to illustrate an UAS is with the aid of a functional layer 
model as shown in Figure 12.  There is no direct one-to-one correspondence between a 
particular subsystem and a particular functional layer, nor is it necessary to explicitly 
show each subsystem in the functional layer model.  The important concept to convey 
concerns the direction of data flows and the reaction times associated with the different 
functional layers within the UAS.  Other systems engineering considerations are shown 
on the right side of the figure.  These design characteristics represent the tradeoffs that 
UAS designers must consider when developing UAS.    
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Figure 12.   UAS Functional Layer Model 
 
The layers implemented in the functional design model show the division between 
the low level fast reaction time components required to implement flight control, 
housekeeping, and sensor maintenance functions traditionally executed by a pilot or 
navigator, from the higher level functions required to execute mission objectives.  Lower 
level functions are treated as services to higher-level functions and low-level 
implementation details should be hidden in order to reduce cognitive load on human 
operators.  For example, if a surveillance mission is initiated, the MCS may require a 
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scan of a road segment and receive the output of a sensor with sufficient resolution and 
dwell time to allow for vehicle identification.  The exact flight path required to point the 
sensor, provide communication connectivity, and/or monitor fuel consumption should be 
provided as a service to the MCS by lower level functions either within the UAV or GCS.  
These services should not be an additional task(s) performed by the MCS. 
 
E. FLY THE SENSOR 
The generic design description presented in this chapter views the UAS as a 
means to put human eyes on a target of interest without the need for those eyes to be in 
physical danger i.e., the virtual pilot idea.  The design focus centers on the UAV which 
must be flown into an area of interest in order to get the appropriate sensors fixed on an 
expected target.  Once this is accomplished and sensor data is successfully transmitted 
back to human operators, the “real mission” can begin.  By “real mission” we mean the 
decision making aspects of missions such as interpreting video from a STAR mission to 
gain intelligence on an adversary or deciding whether or not to launch a missile in a 
Strike mission.  Decision makers are not particularly interested in how a vehicle gets to 
the AOI.  Tasks such as “driving” the aircraft or monitoring a video screen to discern 
useful information from noise is a distraction and impediment from accomplishing the 
more important mission at hand.   
The title of this section, “Fly the Sensor,” implies a shift of focus concerning UAS 
operation.  Instead of concentrating on flying a UAV with the pilot safely on the ground, 
we suggest shifting the mission emphasis to that of flying an appropriate sensor (or 
effector in the case of a combat UAV (UCAV)).  The benefit of designing an UAS with a 
focus on flying the sensor vice the aircraft, is that more human attention is placed on 
mission critical information as opposed to the lesser, but still important, aspects of flying 
the vehicle.   
Notice in the design characteristics of Figure 12 that algorithm complexity 
increases as data rises to higher levels in the functional model.  Algorithm complexity is 
equivalent to the cognitive load or processing “horsepower” that is required of the UAS 
to perform a given task.  The algorithm complexity is proportional to task complexity 
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and, fortunately, also proportional to reaction time.  As tasks become more complex, a 
human would require more thinking, or a computer would require more computing, in 
order to effectively deal with the task.  Performing the higher level functions, such as 
analyzing video, have naturally been delegated to human operators since human operators 
excel over computers when it comes to image understanding.  However, at the lower 
functional levels in the model, the tasks and algorithm complexity become simpler and 
the reaction time required gets compressed.  At this point machines become better than 
humans, in terms of speed and accuracy, and these tasks are better relegated to computers 
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VI. TECHNOLOGY GAPS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While UAS performance has grown by leaps and bounds over the last 20 years, 
there remain a virtually unlimited number of areas where improvements can be made.  
This is particularly true for SUAS since they have been in operation for a shorter period 
of time.  It would be impractical (and probably impossible) to address all the technology 
gaps being confronted by developers of SUAS in one volume.  This chapter will address 
several technology gaps associated with the display of visual data returned from SUAV 
EO sensors (cameras).   
 
B. TARGET GEO-LOCATION 
The ability to rapidly detect and identify potential targets, both fixed and mobile, 
from UAS sensor feeds is a critical function in several mission areas.  Simple geo-
location techniques are sufficient for general orientation but are not suitable for providing 
accurate sub-meter targeting coordinates.  Historically, military target planners relied on 
comparisons between hard copy reference photos and tactical images derived from 
battlefield aerial reconnaissance photo sources.  The advent of digital photography and 
near real-time (NRT) transmission of imagery has shortened the time needed to observe 
an AOI, but the problem of NRT geo-location remains a significant problem particularly 
for SUAS.  To illustrate a fundamental problem associated with target geo-location, 
consider a target located on flat terrain as shown in Figure 13.  Assuming the platform 
sensor’s coordinates are provided by GPS, and the camera attitude is known from 
onboard sensors, the angle to the target (pointing angle) can be readily determined.  With 
this information the target coordinates can be approximated quickly by simple 
trigonometric calculation.  Unfortunately, most terrain is not flat and large inaccuracies 
will result even if the platform location and pointing angle is known.   
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Figure 13.   Target On Flat Terrain (From: www.cardiofix.com; accessed 28 July 2006) 
 
Figure 14 illustrates the error that can result if the terrain is not flat.  This error is 
amplified when the pointing angle increases, for example, when the UAV flies at lower 
altitude (Figure 15 next page). 
 
 




Figure 15.   Error At Lower Altitude (From: www.cardiofix.com; accessed 28 July 2006) 
 
Three key parameters are required to calculate the coordinates of a potential 
target: 1. Known sensor location at time image was captured; 2. Sensor pointing angle 
and 3. Sufficiently detailed 3D terrain model.  Additionally, accurate time stamps are 
needed when the image is captured to synchronize the data.  Even when these parameters 
are known, enormous amounts of computation is required to geo-locate the target of 
interest.  NRT target geo-location can not currently be accomplished aboard the UAV due 
to weight and power constraints, and therefore must be accomplished at the GCS or 
MCS.  The next chapter will describe a unique technology development being pursued at 
Naval Postgraduate School as a possible new technology solution to the target geo-
location problem. 
 
C. IMAGE STABILITY 
Video signals transmitted to the MCS from UAVs are often unstable.  As noted in 
Chapter III, video displayed from a SUAV on the GCS monitor at Camp Roberts was 
observed to “bounce” on and off the screen approximately two to four times per second.  
These oscillations were the result of the SUAV being buffeted by the wind due to its 
small size and mass.  For cameras equipped with zoom capability, the image stability 
problem is worsened when the sensor’s FOV is decreased by zooming in on an area of 
interest.   
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Without steady video, image sharpness declines and it becomes harder for an 
operator to discern finer details.  An operator tasked with watching video can remain 
more alert since eye strain and overall fatigue is reduced when viewing stable video.  The 
possibility also exists to lower the quantity of data (bits) transmitted because steady video 
will compress better than shaky video.  Less data means a smaller storage device is 
required to capture the same video, or more recording time will result with the same 
storage device.   
At the time of this writing, only one of the 12 different small or mini UAS listed 
in the 2005 UAS Roadmap came equipped with some form of video stabilization.  The 
Boeing Corporation’s ScanEagle SUAS utilized an inertially stabilized gimbaled camera 
as standard equipment to provide video stabilization.  During a recent technology 
symposium at the Naval Postgraduate School, the author observed a recording of 
ScanEagle video while operating in wind gusts exceeding 30 mph winds and noted few 
oscillations in the displayed video.  However, inertial stabilization comes with the 
unwanted costs of added weight and increased power requirements.  Alternative image 
processing technologies using new software could be applied to the video stream at the 
GCS.  Though several electronic image stabilization systems are available, their general 
use and effectiveness to SUAS has been limited.  To enhance video image stability, more 
robust image processing or ultra light weight inertial gimbaled camera systems, or a 
combination of these techniques, needs to be developed.   
 
D. SIMULTANEOUS WHAT AND WHERE VIDEO PRESENTATION 
For SUAS, EO cameras are the predominant means for providing video data to 
the MCS, usually on a fixed monitor.  Since the pilot is not seated in the vehicle, 
vestibular feedback received from changes in vehicle attitude i.e., rotations, will not be 
felt.  Other sensory cues such as audio or proprioceptive information from the muscles in 
the neck and eyes which aids pilots with viewing direction are also missing.  Without 
these kinesthetic sensory cues, limitations on the operator’s situational awareness exist.  
These shortcomings can result in degraded operator performance such as losing track of a 
target, difficulties assessing camera, platform, and target motions, confusion in flying 
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direction of the platform, confusion on viewing direction of the camera, disorientation, 
and degraded situational awareness.19 
The current state of UAS automation requires HIL operation and key decisions 
will often have to be made by human operators.  As long as humans remain central to 
UAS operation, there will always be human factors that must be considered in the system 
design.  A recent study was performed that revealed eighteen human factors issues unique 
to UAS that deserve future research.20  Five of the factors are related to the perceptual 
and cognitive aspects of the pilot interface and research is recommended to study the 
affects of providing an “augmented reality” or “synthetic vision.”   
A separate study by Van Erp and Van Breda has identified at least eight 
shortcomings concerning remote camera control of unmanned vehicles.  One of these 
shortcomings addressed in the Problem Definition chapter concerns the field of view 
(FOV).  As the FOV gets smaller, the operator may observe better resolution but this 
comes at the expense of lost context in the area of operation.  In other words, the operator 
may know more about what he or she is seeing (due to better resolution), but will know 
less about where they are looking to do decreased FOV.  The capability to simultaneously 
display what the sensor is pointing at while providing context about where the sensor is 
located is a technology gap existing in most SUAS.   
 
E. BANDWIDTH LIMITATIONS 
While technically not the same as data throughput, bandwidth (BW) is the term 
generally used to describe the data throughput of a communications system.  As the BW 
increases, so does the data throughput.  In broad terms, BW limitations can be created by 
anything that hampers or minimizes that the transmission of data from UAV to the MCS.  
The communications subsystem discussed earlier is responsible for providing the critical 
link between the vehicle sensors and the operators located at the MCS.  The current 
paradigm for SUAS operation, and even for their larger counterparts, is to relay nearly all 
                                                 
19 Van Erp, J.B.F. & Breda, L. van (1999). Human factors issues and advanced interface design in 
maritime Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: a project overview 1995-1998. TNO-TM 1999 A004. Soesterberg, 
The Netherlands: TNO-HFRI. 
20 Human Factors Implications of UAVs in the National Airspace, Jason S. McCarley & Christopher 
D. Wickens, April 2005. 
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sensor data back to the MCS for processing.  The amount of raw data collected by 
onboard sensors easily exceeds the onboard processing power of SUAS.  To convert this 
data to useful intelligence, the communications subsystem must transmit this data to the  
MCS for processing.  When doing so, they frequently overwhelm the available 
communications BW.  This section considers several limitations associated with the BW 
of SUAS.   
1. Power Limitations 
The communications subsystem is constrained by the power output of the onboard 
transmitter and the gain of the transmitting antenna.  The output power must be sufficient 
to overcome any losses that could be encountered while transmitting data from the UAV 
to the MCS.  Most SUAS employ omni-directional antennas that radiate radio waves 
equally in all directions similar to the way the sun radiates light into space.  Since the 
signal is uniform strength in all directions there is no need to worry about directing the 
antenna, but this method is not very power efficient.  Radio frequency power decreases 
with distance squared.  For example, if the MCS is to receive a signal of a given strength 
from a UAV which moves twice as far away, the onboard transmitter would need to 
produce four times the power.   
To improve performance, the UAS could radiate at higher power or the GCS 
could employ a directional antenna with a tracking capability to maximize the power 
received from the UAV.  The latter technique is employed by the NPS SUAS.  By 
following the UAV flight path with a high gain directional antenna, the GCS is able to 
receive a greater amount of the signal being transmitted from the SUAV.  The former 
technique could also be used to improve signal reception from longer distances.  Of 
course the disadvantages of this method are seen as increased size and weight of the 
UAV transmitter.  Most SUAS, and all hand launched systems have payload capacities 
well under 10 pounds21.  Additionally, most hand-launched UAV uses batteries to 
provide for all power requirements including propulsion.  To get more power, the UAV 
would have to carry a larger battery which means more weight, which means less 
                                                 
21 The 2005 UAS Roadmap lists eight out of nine SUAS with payloads less than 10 pounds. 
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endurance.  These tradeoffs must be considered to optimize the performance for any 
particular UAS mission.  
2. Vulnerability of Active Transmitter 
When an omni-directional antenna radiates, no mechanism is in place to direct the 
signal energy, hence anyone with a suitable receiver can detect its transmission.  Given 
the large amounts of data collected, particularly from imagery collection associated with 
STAR missions, the transmitter often appears to be continuously transmitting.  This 
situation makes the transmitting UAV more vulnerable to detection and attack since an 
adversary will have more time to locate its position.  To mitigate this vulnerability, 
transmitted data can be compressed to reduce the required BW.  The downside of this 
technique is that compression algorithms intentionally discard information that could be 
valuable.  Until onboard processing power increases enough to minimize transmission 
requirements, compression algorithms will remain one of the better solutions to fill this 
gap.  
3. Line-of-Sight Limit 
High altitude UAS can maintain high bandwidth communication links over great 
distances with other UAVs or the MCS due to their large line-of-sight (LOS) distance.  
SUAS normally fly at altitudes of less than 1000 feet and have maximum RF LOS of 
approximately 70 km (Figure 7 Radio LOS vs. Altitude).  This coverage assumes ideal 
conditions with no obstructions between UAV and MCS and high enough transmission 
power to complete the radio link.  For low altitude SUAS flying in urban areas with 
buildings or in areas with hills, a LOS data link can easily become obstructed.  
Additionally, discussion with SUAV operators revealed that more typical operating 
ranges are between 3 and 10 nautical miles due to transmission power limitations.   
The terrain encountered during field experiments at Camp Roberts is 
characterized by many low rolling hills throughout the airspace which often obstruct the 
LOS between GCS and UAV.  To overcome this limitation, multiple UAVs can be flown 
to act as relays or as part of a mesh network.  One of the problems with this solution is 
the added expense in flying multiple UAVs.  Also, when utilizing a mesh network 
topology, throughput is limited due to bottlenecks on the last node making connection 
with the GCS.   
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F. SENSOR DATA MANAGEMENT 
UAS sensors have the capacity to generate huge amounts of data.  Large UAS are 
capable of producing ≈1017 bits per second (bps) of information.22  If only a fraction of 
this data is transmitted it would still easily exceed the data link BW capacity of modern 
UAS.  Most SUAS are equipped with multiple aircraft per system.  In most cases, STAR 
missions are still predominantly performed utilizing only one airborne UAV due to 
frequency conflicts with other UAVs.  However, this paradigm is shifting as experience 
with flying multiple UAVs increases and the technology to support it advances.  The raw 
data returned from UAV sensors is of little value if the information cannot be synthesized 
and understood within a time span that permits military decision-makers to act.  Three 
sensor data management gaps have been identified in SUAS are addressed next.   
  1. Instant video playback 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the video received and displayed on the GCS monitor 
can arrive rapidly making it difficult for an operator to detect features or targets of 
interest.  The lower the altitude of the sensor, the quicker the data will pass on the screen 
for any given UAV speed.  At typical speeds of SUAVs (80 to 100 km/hr), the altitude 
must be greater than approximately 500 feet to detect a target within a 2.8 second 
window.  Usually when a target is detected the operators will want to see it again right 
away to verify what they think they saw.  Without a video playback capability, the sensor 
would need to be repositioned in order to again find the target.  For moving targets, a 
video playback capability becomes even more important.  Current SUAS operations 
dictate flying the UAV to a point where the MPO can direct the sensor to get a fix on a 
potential target within the AOI.  Obviously, this becomes significantly more challenging 
for moving targets and requires a good deal of coordination between the AVO and MPO.  
A better paradigm would prescribe “flying the sensor” as opposed to flying the UAV and 
will be discussed in the following chapter.   
2. Multi-view Retrieval  
When a sensor passes over anything of interest, the operator observes that area 
from the angle at which the sensor is pointing.  In addition to having the record and 
playback capability mentioned above, the operator should have the ability to retrieve 
                                                 
22 Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations, The National Academies Press, 2005, p. 
208. 
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images from other sensors taken at different times and from other perspectives.  
Historical data of the AOI would have to be stored and made easily available to the MCS 
operator in a timely manner else its value is diminished.  To minimize the possibility of 
information overload on man and machine, the operator could be asked to provide his or 
her AOR on the user interface.  The data management application would ensure that only 
data within this relevant area is retrieved.  Additionally, all stored historical data would 
necessarily be geo-referenced to ensure consistency with the current view with which it is 
being compared.   
3. Image Difference and Change Detection 
The need to rapidly detect and accurately geo-locate a target’s location was 
identified above as a technology gap that impacts several UAS missions.  Traditional 
image registration techniques tend to fail in the presence of complications such as cloud 
occultation, elevation distortions, and illumination variations and automated registration 
of oblique low angle views has remained difficult23.  A technology solution is being 
developed at Naval Postgraduate School that utilizes software algorithms and an image 
differencing technique to address this problem.  The approach used employs two low cost 
PC based workstations and a software package called Perspective View Nascent 
Technologies (PVNT).  One computer executes a program that captures images at one 
second intervals and synchronizes them with received telemetry messages.  The other 
computer running the PVNT software generates telemetry controlled calculated 
perspective views from received GPS and camera angle coordinates at one second 
intervals.  The combined system manages the sensor data and provides target position 
estimates with 1-2 meter accuracy. 
 
                                                 
23 A Description of Image Targeting with PVNT Target Location and Sensor Fusion through 


























VII. TECHNOLOGY SOLUTION DEVELOPMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to some industry experts, the Joint Strike Fighter will be the last major 
DoD manned aircraft acquisition.  This means that UAS will have to fill the ever 
widening gap that develops as manned aircraft decline in number.  It is critical, therefore, 
that the U.S. exploit new technology for UAS to the maximum extent possible in order to 
maintain its current edge and direct the industry in ways advantageous to national 
security.  Additionally, the nature of modern asymmetric warfare is dictating a 
fundamental paradigm shift from platform to network centric warfare in order to 
effectively and affordably fight the wars of the 21st century.  UAS have demonstrated 
their ability to work in the net-centric environment and warfighters are increasingly 
requesting their capabilities.  
In this chapter, we describe two different ideas or concepts concerning the 
operation of UAS.  The first idea represents the prevailing concept today.  It follows 
naturally from the way we have historically operated manned and unmanned aircraft with 
the pilot and aircraft at the center of the mission.  The current state of technology 
supports this concept and there is little wonder why it prevails.  The second idea proposes 
an alternative view that places emphasis on the mission as opposed to the pilot and 
aircraft.  Instead of thinking in terms of flying the aircraft, we suggest the concept of 
“flying the sensor.”  The current state of technology has not caught up to this idea, but it 
is only a matter of time before it does and new UAS system designs should move in this 
direction.   
For SUAS, the technology gaps identified in Chapter VI will be best solved 
utilizing a software, vice a hardware approach.  In this chapter, the reasons that support 
the pursuit of software over hardware technology solutions are presented.  Technology 
developments applicable to the identified shortfalls are being pursued at NPS.  While the 
potential solutions are focused on advancing the mission support for SUAS, much of this 
technology has equal applicability to any UAS.  It is our hope that this research will 
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enhance the design of SUAS flight and mission control support systems (FMCSS) and 
stimulate new ideas and research in the field of UAS.  
 
B. DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 
Every good system design process starts with an overarching idea or goal that 
guides the architect and other system designers.  The common goal or “big picture” idea 
helps designers form a picture in their mind of what the system is suppose to accomplish 
or behave.  The mental picture envisioned has little direct affect on detailed design 
decisions, but instead provides a framework in which to place the detailed design 
decisions that will be made at a later stage.  Concerning UAS design, one major design 
philosophy prevails.  This approach is described next followed by an alternative approach 
that will become more appropriate as the services become more net-centric.  It is 
important to note that regardless of the design philosophy chosen, the ultimate goal 
remains to design a better system that enables warfighters to accomplish their mission in 
the most effective manner possible with limited resources.   
1. “Brain in the Cockpit” 
The current paradigm in UAS design centers on the concept of keeping one UAV 
operator’s head (brain) in the cockpit while leaving his or her body on the ground.  
System designers want to, ideally, replicate the cognitive powers of a human (perhaps 
even super-human) in the cockpit with some type of computer processing.  Where 
shortcomings remain, the system is augmented by a remote human operator through a 
data link to the UAV.   
To the extent that we can put an operators head in the cockpit while leaving his or 
her body on the ground, determines how closely the UAS can perform when compared to 
its manned counterpart.  Similar to a person in a flight simulator or playing a video game 
(virtual pilot), the pilot on the ground, with the aid of information processors, can control 
the aircraft as if he or she was sitting in the cockpit.  They operate the aircraft under all 
possible conditions that the aircraft can fly and make decisions when uncertainty and 
confusion exist.  For example, when bearing arms, the virtual pilot will operate under the 
rules of engagement (ROE) and make tough decisions about when and when not to use 
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deadly force.  With the HIL, the full range of human judgment, intellectual capability and 
moral character can be brought to bear in any mission.   
2. “Fly the Sensor” 
An alternate design philosophy takes emphasis off the pilot and aircraft and shifts 
it to information.  We have labeled this concept “fly the sensor” to emphasize the 
importance of a sensor in collecting mission critical information regardless of platform 
type.  This is an important distinction to make now that war is being waged in the 
Information Age.  We don’t care so much about where or what platform the information 
comes from, as we do about its qualities such as accuracy and timeliness.  To enable this 
warfighting philosophy, the DoD has invested resources to build a Global Information 
Grid (GIG) that will allow the military to conduct Network Centric Warfare (NCW).  
NCW can be defined as:   
an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates 
increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and 
shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, 
higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a 
degree of self-synchronization24. 
The “fly the sensor” design philosophy is consistent with the concept envisioned in NCW 
and places more human attention on mission critical information as opposed to tasks 
involving UAV flight.   
 
C. HARDWARE VERSUS SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS 
People living today are witnessing a technological explosion similar to, but more 
rapid, than the technological growth experienced during the industrial revolution of the 
19th and early 20th centuries.  During that period the economy was dominated by 
machinery and manufacturing.  Today the developed nations of the world have entered a 
new economic era, sometimes referred to as the digital revolution, being led by 
advancements in computer hardware and software.  The time between significant 
technological developments is rapidly decreasing and we have reached the knee of the 
curve in an evolution of technology.  Author and inventor Ray Kurzweil has described 
                                                 
24 Network Centric Warfare: Developing & Leveraging Information Superiority, David Alberts, John 
Garstka, Frederick Stein.  CCRP Publications series, February 2000.  p. 2. 
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this phenomenon as the “Law of Accelerating Returns”25 and predicts no limit to the 
exponential growth of technology.   
In today’s information age, technology advances can be broadly classified into 
two major categories: hardware and software.  While hardware is a general term which 
includes any type of machine, tool or other physical components, the hardware making 
the most impact in the information age, is computer hardware.  Computer hardware was 
developed before any software was produced.  Indeed computer hardware had to come 
first, for without computer hardware it is impossible to run any software.  The computing 
field is only about 60 years old beginning on the tail end of the industrial revolution, but 
its growth is without precedent in the world of engineering.  The most significant 
hardware development to occur in the history of computing is the integrated circuit.  
Starting with the invention of the transistor in 1947, which replaced vacuum tubes, 
integrated circuits with millions of transistors on one substrate were developed and have 
now become ubiquitous.   
Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, famously noted in a 1965 article of 
Electronics Magazine that the complexity (interpreted as the number of transistors) of  
 
Figure 16.   Gordon Moore 
 
integrated circuits doubles roughly every year.  In a follow-on article in 1975 he adjusted 
this estimate to every two years to account for chip complexity.26  This trend has held 
                                                 
25 The Age of Spiritual Machines; Ray Kurzweil; 1999. 
26 Technology@Intel Magazine entitled: From Moore's Law to Intel Innovation—Prediction to 
Reality; Radhakrishna Hiremane; April 2005. 
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remarkably true (Figure 17) and is believed by many, that it will last for at least another 
10 to 20 years before a fundamental physical limit is reached.   
 
Figure 17.   Moore’s Law (From: website: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Moore_Law_diagram_%282004%29.jpg 
accessed July 28, 2006)  
 
Software is a distinct technology that consists of digital data or programs residing 
inside a computer’s hardware (memory).  Software can’t be seen or felt and takes up no 
physical space within the hardware.  Computer hardware and software technologies must 
work together to both produce value.  As the computer hardware industry races ahead 
providing more powerful capabilities, and better-faster-cheaper computing and 
communication devices, a software gap has developed that prevents us from exploiting 
all the capability and value that these hardware devices promise.  So which technology 
provides more “bang for the buck” and which technology needs more focused attention 
and resources when designing future SUAS flight and mission control support systems 
(FMCSS)?  
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It is hard to definitively or quantitatively answer this question, however, the 
research conducted while writing this thesis points in the direction of software, 
particularly image processing and data handling applications that can improve the 
effectiveness of STAR missions.  The computer hardware improvements realized, for 
example, as a result of Moore’s Law, will continue unabated regardless of the direction 
taken by the designers of SUAS.  Software developments, on the other hand, that 
specifically add value to SUAS will require focused efforts on the part of SUAS 
designers.  New software developments offer the possibility to significantly improve the 
functionality of SUAS by shifting more work off humans and accomplishing it in the 
software.   
The same argument advocating software over hardware improvements can be 
applied to airframe hardware as well.  Airframe hardware improvements, such as 
inertially stabilized gimbaled cameras, will usually result in added weight to the UAV 
platform.  Adding weight lowers endurance for the same fuel load and increases total 
costs.  Figure 18 shows the empty weight and cost data for several DoD UAVs.  Today 
the average cost for the UAVs listed is $1500 per pound of empty weight.  When the 
payload is included the cost jumps to approximately $8000 per pound of payload weight  
 
Figure 18.   UAS And UAV Costs And Weights (From: UAS Roadmap, 2005) 
 
(Figure 19).  Note, however, for the only SUAV listed, the Dragon Eye, the cost per 
pound is significantly greater in both categories—approximately $30,000 per pound.  
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Any airframe hardware technology improvements would have to be made with very light 
weight materials to keep costs from skyrocketing.  To improve SUAS capability with 
hardware, the most cost effective solutions will likely be achieved if they are applied to 
the ground or mission control stations.   
 
Figure 19.   UAV Capability Metric: Weight V. Cost (From: UAS Roadmap, 2005) 
 
In this chapter software solutions are presented as a way to fill the technology 
gaps identified earlier.  The hope is that these potential solutions may lead to significant 




A vision-based target tracking system has been developed and is being refined at 
NPS.  The system has the potential to significantly improve the process of identifying 
target coordinates obtained in STAR missions performed by SUAS (or any UAS).  The 
system was utilized in a field experiment discussed in the next chapter and is described in 
the paragraphs that follow.   
Video captured by an EO camera aboard a SUAV is transmitted on a 2.4 GHz link 
to the GCS.  The GCS uses off-the-shelf PerceptiVU image processing software27 which 
allows an operator to select and lock on a target displayed on the GCS monitor.  The 
PerceptiVU software provides coordinates of the centroid of the target selected by the 
operator.  These coordinates are then employed by control and filtering algorithms 
implemented on the NPS ground station.28  Flight tests conducted by NPS have 
demonstrated the ability to provide 20-30m accuracy in target geo-location obtained 
within 15-20 seconds of tracking.   
The system can operate within a mesh network that allows data sharing between 
all nodes connected to the system.  In addition to the real-time tracking and estimation 
algorithms employed by the GCS, the UAVs telemetry and onboard images are sent to a 
Perspective View Nascent Technologies (PVNT) workstation that enables more precise 
geo-location measurements to be obtained.  The PVNT is a general software package 
addressing the generation and utilization of metrically accurate one-meter terrain 
databases for measurement, analysis, and visualization of live/virtual tactical battlefield 
situations.  The system implements a unique image registration technique that allows near 
real time (NRT) view projections with elevations included.  Other techniques tend to 
concentrate on the alignment of actual images taken from various angles and tend to fail 
in the presence of complications such as cloud occultation, elevation distortions, and 
illumination variations.  PVNT performs registration between a measured image and an 
image calculated from a terrain database as opposed to registering two or more images 
directly. Using this approach, the viewpoint can be modified and a new image generated 
                                                 
27 PerceptiVU Inc, www. Perceptive.com 
28 Ick H. Whang , Vladimir N. Dobrokhodov , Isaac I. Kaminer, and Kevin D. Jones, “On Vision-
Based Target Tracking and Range Estimation for Small UAVs," AIAA 2005-6401, AIAA Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control Conference and Exhibit, 15 - 18 August 2005, San Francisco, CA. 
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that includes elevation distortions, surface occultation, and to some extent atmospheric 
effects.  This procedure enables comparison of images which have to a large extent been 
corrected for these parameters.   
The PVNT system consists of two standard PC computers. One executes an 
interface program that captures and displays six seconds of images each at one second 
intervals and synchronizes the images with telemetry messages.  The second computer 
running the PVNT software generates telemetry controlled calculated perspective views 
from received GPS and camera angle coordinates at one second intervals. The calculated 
and measured views are then registered and differenced to highlight the target.29  When 
the calculated and measured view are close enough to perform target location, the PVNT 
operator then performs a final target location by clicking on the location in the calculated 
image where the target would appear if it were in the database.  The advantage of this 
vision-based target tracking approach is that the accuracies of target location is 
determined almost exclusively by the accuracy of the database and does not require 
precision gimbals or accurate UAV location data.  The combined system provides target 
position estimates with 1-2m accuracy and has been successfully demonstrated in several 
field experiments conducted by NPS at Camp Roberts.30  Figure 20 shows the FOV from 
two sensors and the calculated perspective views generated by PVNT.  
 
                                                 
29 W. Baer, T. Campbell, “Target Location and Sensor Fusion through Calculated and Measured 
Image Differencing,” Signal Processing, Sensor Fusion, and Target Recognition XII, Ivan Kadar, Editor, 
Proceedings of SPIE Vol 5096(2003) p 169. 
30 Vision Based Target Tracking and Network Control for Mini UAVs; I. Kaminer, V. Dobrokhodov, 
K. Jones and W. Baer. 
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Figure 20.   PVNT FOV and Calculated Images 
 
E. IMAGE STABILITY 
Image stability can be improved utilizing hardware or software techniques.  
Hardware solutions are categorized as active or passive.  Passive stabilization techniques 
are purely mechanical and rely on the "balanced beam" phenomena.  The 'beam' will 
resist base motion from affecting the camera positioned at the end of it because of the 
inherent inertia of the balanced beam.  Active hardware systems are ones that utilize DC 
power, sensors, electronics and motors attached to gimbal rings to correct base motion 
from affecting the camera.31  For UAS, hardware solutions are acceptable only on larger 
platforms where weight and power limitations do not restrict their use.   
For SUAS with payloads one or two orders of magnitude smaller than larger 
UAS, ultra light weight inertially stabilized gimbaled camera systems or more robust 
image processing techniques, or a combination of both, offer the only practical solution.  
There are several companies that currently market software products that claim to 
improve video stability.   
 
                                                 
31 Nettman Systems International website: http://www.camerasystems.com/gyrostabilization.htm, 
accessed 4 September 2006.   
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1. Tactical Image Processing Software (TIPS) 
TIPS made by Brandes Associates Incorporated is a portable system designed for 
small and mini-UAV missions.  It employs enhancement algorithms that penetrate fog, 
haze and mirage artifacts commonly found in the raw input video stream.  The video 
image stream data can be stabilized in 4-dimensions (X and Y, rotation, scaling and 
zooming) to counter vibration encountered on SUAV payloads.  It accepts most video 
input formats providing day and night video image enhancement.  TIPS performs as a 
passthru system with a delay of no more than 2 frames.   
The TIPS system was operationally tested with PVNT.  The application 
automatically cropped and readjusted the image position to the center of the monitor with 
every frame capture.  One observer reported a fuzzy picture containing artifacts in the 
displayed image and questions whether the advertised preprocessing capability to provide 
contrast enhancement and image sharpening was actually achieved.  Company website is 
accessible at: http://www.brandes-assoc.com/technology_insertion%20v2.HTML 
2. SteadyEyeTM 
Made by DynaPel Systems Incorporated, SteadyEye is an application that 
integrates with analog Color, B/W, IR or thermal cameras.  The system advertises the 
ability to correct shake in the horizontal and vertical direction as well as shake from 
rotation and zoom.  The system was tested with the NPS SUAV with only marginal 
results.  One operator suggested that it would produce acceptable results if used in 
conjunction with inertial stabilization.  Company website is accessible at:  
http://www.dynapel.com/index.shtml 
3. VICE 
Designed by Sarnoff® Corporation, VICE (Video Imagery Capability 
Enhancement) claims a host of real time video processing capabilities on a standard PC.  
The software provides electronic stabilization to remove camera shake and real time 
mosaicing to create panoramic views of a scene as the camera pans.  It has an automatic 
moving target indicator (MTI) that can graphically show or alert operators to a moving 
target in the image view.  The software can display 3D video for up to eight video feeds 
on reference imagery or maps and merge other forms of data with the video. 
70 
The VICE system was recently tested for compatibility with the NPS PVNT 
software in field experiments conducted at Camp Roberts.  The experiment successfully 
demonstrated the ability to capture and transfer stabilized imagery to PVNT.  The 
successful integration will lead to future experiments to see if images stabilized through 
the mosaic process would improve SUAS STAR mission performance.  Company 
website accessible at:  http://www.sarnoff.com/ 
4. Future Possible Solutions 
In general, the problem with image stabilization occurs when multiple images are 
superimposed on one another.  Most software applications employ algorithms that take 
averages of pixel contrast to reconstruct images.  While this may produce a more stable 
image, its value is degraded because the image tends to become “fuzzy.”  Potential 
solutions to this problem may lie in innovative new algorithms that do more than simply 
take pixel averages.  Two areas are suggested for research that could possibly minimize 
or solve this problem: 1. Radar mono-pulse scanning and 2. saccadic eye movement.   
Radar mono-pulse scanning is used in fire-control tracking radars and employs 
one radar pulse to obtain a target’s range, bearing and elevation angle.  Mono-pulse 
tracking radars achieve higher target resolution by comparing the target location in 
multiple pulses, hence it is not the pulse width, but the envelope between multiple pulses 
that determines angular resolution.  This radar technique can be accomplished 
electronically requiring no mechanical action and is not subject to errors due to rapid 
fluctuation of the returned echo signal amplitude as the target moves (scintillation errors).   
Saccadic eye movements are very rapid simultaneous movements in both eyes in 
the same direction.  These movements occur naturally in human vision so that the point 
of interest will be centered on the fovea, the high resolution central part of the retina.  
Human vision has evolved to make these adjustments as fast as possible and saccades are 
the fastest movement of the external part of the human body.  Even when fixated on a 
stationary target, micro-saccades are required to refresh the image cast on the retina 
because receptors in the retina are only responsive to changes in luminance.  These eye 
movements occur naturally and are not perceived as image instability in the brain.  
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Both mono-pulsing radar and saccadic eye movements are examples by which 
image clarity and resolution are improved with multiple measurements.  Not all image 
stabilization techniques employ visual methods, and therefore stabilized images are often 
less clear, although stable.  Further study is needed to determine how these techniques 
could be applied to improve image resolution.  It is hoped that algorithms may be created 
based on the physics of mono-pulse scanning or saccadic eye movements that reduce or 
eliminate the distortions observed in image stabilized video.   
 
F. WHAT-WHERE DISPLAY 
Chapter VI identified a gap in the ability to simultaneously display what a sensor 
is pointing at while providing context about where the sensor is located.  The PVNT 
system offers a possible software solution to this problem.  By mapping the actual 
measured image collected from an EO sensor to the video cones displayed in Figure 18, 
an operator would be able to see both what the sensor is looking at, as well as context on 
where the sensor is located.  This idea was tested in the field experiment described in the 
next chapter.  It should also be pointed out that the PVNT system can project the returned 
images on other map displays besides the “god’s eye” view shown in Figure 20.  For 




Figure 21.   PVNT Perspective Views on Cartographic Map 
 
The ability to project multiple images on one display is a step in the direction 
toward lowering the human to UAV ratio discussed earlier.  This simultaneous what-
where display could be combined with “fly-the-sensor” technology allowing UAV flight 
to be controlled directly through the manipulation of sensor projections potentially 
lowering the cognitive load placed on UAS operators.   
 
G. SENSOR DATA MANAGEMENT 
This section addresses two of the three technology gaps related to sensor data 
management identified in Chapter VI.  These technology solutions were tested in a recent 
field experiment and will be discussed in Chapter VIII. 
1. Instant Video Playback 
The PVNT system provides a means to capture, display, record and playback 
video frames transmitted from EO sensors.  The system has been designed to allow an 








video captured at any time during the mission, however, practical limitations such as disk 
space limit the amount of playback allowed.  This playback capability may enhance 
mission success by precluding the necessity for a UAV to fly over an area previously 
viewed.  The results of this video playback capability are discussed in Chapter VIII.  
2. Image Difference and Change Detection 
In addition to providing highly accurate geo-located target coordinates as 
described above, PVNT can use its excellent and accurate data presentation to identify 
changes in terrain.  Terrain changes can be produced naturally due to weather, 
earthquakes, or volcanic activity; or by people constructing buildings or simply placing 
objects in different positions.  Detecting terrain changes with SUAS can be quicker and 
safer than sending people or manned aircraft or over hostile areas.  Using SUAS is also a 
better alternative than satellite reconnaissance because satellites are predictable allowing 
an adversary to deceive or hide important information.   
 
H. PRODUCT-LINE ARCHITECTURE 
Table 6 in Chapter IV identified important functions required for various UAS 
missions and listed where these functions are performed within the five subsystems of a 
generic UAS.  These subsystems were laid out in the functional layer model of Figure 12 
to illustrate where these subsystems are located within a typical UAS.  The functional 
divisions are separated in time by approximately two orders of magnitude each.  The 
values indicated on the figure are representative of the current technology level that 
SUAS operate.  Ideally, we would like everything to happen as efficiently as possible, 
exactly when needed and consuming as few resources as possible.  However, the other 
design characteristics listed on the figure must also be considered and tradeoffs will have 
to be made when designing SUAS (or any system).   
To achieve the desired mission success, the functions listed in Table 6 must be 
performed by entities or components i.e., humans, hardware, or software or some 
combination.  These components must be connected together in an architecture or 
framework that permits information exchange between them.  Besides the 
communication subsystem represented by the clouds in Figure 12, data is passed between 
components through application interfaces consisting of:  
74 
• Transport protocols i.e., TCP/IP, UDP, etc. 
• Web addresses i.e., URLs 
• Message data definitions i.e., Cursor on Target (CoT) 
Most SUAS contain a variety of similar application requirements that can be 
designed with mostly generic software.  To maximize the interoperability of the software 
components that may come from a variety of different vendors, formal interface 
definitions are required.  To achieve the desired result, a product-line architecture is 
recommended as the best approach [2, 3].  A product-line architecture defines a set of 
reusable generic components and specifies how data and control should flow among them 
to solve application problems32.  A well designed architecture conducive to “plug and 
play” operation will encourage developers to create interoperable components of 
increasing quality and capability.   
The functional model discussed above is a first cut attempt to define the 
functional components and framework in which a generic SUAS FMCSS may be 
designed.  The next step requires the development of formal data specifications for use in 
a product-line architecture.  A rapid benefit of this approach would be the reduction of 
ad-hoc face-to-face meetings of individuals that are necessary to work out data 
management problems currently experienced in the NPS field experiments.  
 
G. BANDWIDTH 
While some of the missions identified in this thesis may not require huge amounts 
of bandwidth, the primary reconnaissance missions as well as combat search and rescue 
(CSAR) and some communication relay missions depending on the data relayed, all 
require significant amounts of bandwidth to transmit imagery data.  Technologies that 
enable more processing to be accomplished onboard the UAV only slightly help to 
mitigate this problem.  As the vehicle becomes more autonomous, less data is needed 
between GCS and UAV.  Unfortunately, the command and control data is only a small 
fraction of the total amount of information that must be transmitted.  As the military 
                                                 
32 Model-based Communication Networks and VIRT: Filtering Information by Value to Improve 
Collaborative Decision-Making; Dr. Rick Hayes-Roth, Naval Postgraduate School, April 2005.   
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strives to achieve the objective of net-centricity, issues with bandwidth limitations are 
likely to continue in the foreseeable future and will continue to receive focused attention.   
One possible solution involves using a mesh network as opposed to individual 
direct links.  In a mesh network, multiple nodes e.g., UAVs, can be used to transmit data 
much like routers in a ground based network.  By increasing the number of nodes the 
number of possible paths available to transmit data increases.  Theoretically, with more 
pathways available, there exists a larger “pipe” i.e., greater bandwidth, in which to 
transmit data.   
The mesh technique has recently been tested in the NPS field experiments with 
unmanned ground and aerial vehicles.  The technology tested is made by ITT and uses a 
proprietary protocol similar to the IEEE 802.16 protocol.  So far the technology has 
produced less than desirable results.  When multiple users tried to access data from 
different individual UAVs, a new data stream from the UAV platform was generated over 
the mesh network to the receiving clients.  As a result, when more than one user wanted 
to receive video, the network load capacity was exceeded and performance became 
difficult.   
To solve this problem, digital video from the UAV’s was transmitted to a single 
Pelco receiver where it was reconverted to analog video, sent via a cable to the TOC and 
reconverted to digital video where it could be locally distributed on higher bandwidth 
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VIII. FMCSS FIELD EXPERIMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Every academic quarter a series of experiments coordinated by NPS and Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM) is conducted in cooperation with a number of other 
government organizations, industry and universities.  The bulk of the experiments take 
place at Camp Roberts located approximately 120 miles south of NPS.  Much of the 
research is focused on unmanned air and ground vehicle operations as well as the 
network supporting these operations.  Two experiments are described in this chapter; one 
took place in early June of 2006, the other during the third week of August 2006.  
Officially the experiments were designated TNT-06-3 and TNT-06-4 respectively.   
 
Figure 22.   TNT UAVs 
 
B. TNT EXPERIMENT 06-3 
The Flight and Mission Control Support System’s (FMCSS) overarching 
objective was to support flight coordination, feature identification, and target location for 
multiple SUAVs.  Specifically, experiment 06-3 objectives were to:  
• Synchronized Image Playback:  Test image capture, storage, and 
playback function to support image navigation and feature identification 
and target location.  
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• Multiple UAV Sensor Projection Display: Test multiple SUAS sensor 
on map projection display to enhance the operator’s ability to manage 
multiple data streams at once. 
• Interface Testing:  Define and test general SUAS interfaces for video and 
telemetry to provide mission support for alternative UAV platforms. 
The discussion that follows will cover the salient portions of first two 
objectives.33 
1. General Setup 
Figure 23 illustrates the layout of SUAS FMCSS that was setup in the Camp 
Roberts Tactical Operations Center (TOC).  PC interface machines, IF-1 and IF-2 in the 
figure, can receive video and GPS telemetry from two UAVs.  IF-1 and IF-2 capture and 
format data for transmission to the middle PVNT PC.  The PVNT machine performs 
image geo-referencing, target coordinate determination and provides image display 
locally or to larger situational awareness (SA) screens within the TOC. 
 
Figure 23.   SUAS FMCSS 
 
                                                 
33 Full technical details and thorough description of the experiment can be found in the final report 
entitled: UAV Flight and Precision Targeting Mission Control Experiment 20 Report for TNT-06-3; Dr. 
Baer, June 16, 2006. 
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2. Detailed Schematic 
Figure 24 shows the connectivity, equipment and software configuration for 
experiment TNT-06-3.  Telemetry paths are shown as solid arrows while video data is 
depicted with wide arrows.  Two video streams are monitored and selected frames are 
transferred to the PVNT machine for local display and also for projection onto larger wall 
screens within the TOC for wider review. 
Special interfaces were established to both NPS SUAVs using Pelco transmitters.  
One transmitter on each SUAV broadcasted video over a mesh network to the GCS 
where it was then placed on the TOC network where it became accessible through 
browser based Pelco plug-ins.  SUAV telemetry was transmitted to a second Pelco 




Figure 3-2 Camp Roberts Configuration 
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Figure 24.   Detailed Schematic 
 
3. Synchronized Image Playback 
This part of the experiment was designed to address the technology gap identified 
in Chapter VI concerning sensor data management.  The previous chapter suggested a 
potential solution to this problem could be developed that would allow an operator to 
essentially “rewind” previous video data returned in order to perform a more detailed 
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analysis.  To test the ability to display, record and playback a series of frames, code was 
written by NPS professor Dr. Wolfgang Baer and installed onto the interface machines 
depicted above.  Our hope is that a low cost software solution can be developed that will 
improve an operators effectiveness while performing surveillance type missions, such as 
STAR.  A brief description of this software is provided below34.   
The software component, called Video Time Trail Playback, provides a means to 
display, record and playback a series of frames, called the Window.  A trail consisting of 
several (9 max) sequential frames is displayed on separate windows in the interface 
machine.  Figure 25 below shows a typical screen snapshot showing the display. 
 
               
  
Figure 25.   CRP_Interface Program Screen 
 
Incoming video frames from a SUAV sensor are displayed in the large viewer 
screen shown on the left side of Figure 21.  An operator uses this view to look for and 
detect features of interest. The nine trailing frames provide a display of the last 9 captured 
frames.  The capture rate is selectable but 1 second is typical. 
In earlier experiments it was found that 9 seconds was inadequate for an operator 
to perform useful analysis on the incoming frames.  The Video Time Trail Playback 
                                                 
34 A detailed description is provided by Dr. Baer entitled: VideoTimeTrailAndPlaybackFunction.doc; 













software component was designed to allow an operator to select a buffer size (limited 
only by disk storage capacity) that would store video frames that could be played back 
for comparison and analysis.  A disk buffer and slider control was added, set to a default 
value of 100 frames, to allow instant image playback.  Frame telemetry is synchronized 
and recorded with each frame so that its geographic location can be determined.  The trail 
and image manipulation features are expected to provide the operator context to 
individual frames and facilitate both target identification and location.  The intent was to 
evaluate technology trade-offs in global system functions, which enhance mission 
success, and see how much the Video Time Trail Playback component helps.  
The experiment succeeded at recording and providing instant image playback 
during several flights.  However, orientation data was never received and the limited 
position data was delayed between 5 and 10 seconds making geo-referenced playback 
impossible.  A direct data interface to the NPS SUAV designed to provide on-time 
position and attitude telemetry was never achieved due to wind and communication 
difficulties.  These difficulties were overcome during a repeat experiment in the TNT-06 
trials described below.   
4. Multiple UAV Sensor Projection Display  
This part of the experiment was also designed to address a sensor data 
management gap as well as the simultaneous display of what and where video 
information.  In this case the problem concerns providing a video display that contains 
both what and where information simultaneously while conducting STAR missions.  
Typically two operators at the GCS are involved to conduct operations involving one 
UAV; an air vehicle operator (AVO), and a mission payload operator (MPO).  The AVO 
will observe a situational analysis (SA) display that provides context concerning the 
location of the UAV.  The MPO will focus his or her attention on a separate display 
containing the real time returned video.  Mission effectiveness is affected by how well 
both operators coordinate with each other to “drive” the UAV and analyze the returned 
reconnaissance data.  
In this experiment, the solution developed employs a software algorithm written 
by Dr. Baer that projects video imagery from multiple UAVs (two in this case) onto a 
single large map or perspective SA display.  The goal is to provide a low cost software 
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solution that can be implemented in a MCS that will improve operator effectiveness 
while performing STAR missions.  A successful solution will help a single operator 
understand, manage and control sensor data from multiple UAV’s simultaneously.  At the 
time of the experiment, bandwidth limitations prevented real time video from being 
displayed so only captured imagery was transferred.  The intent of this experiment was to 
determine if the proposed solution could be implemented.  If so, new display technology 
development that fuses multiple real time data streams on one overview would be 
justified.  In the future, this display could be used to expand the “fly the sensor” concept 
to “fly the swarm of sensors.” 
Imagery from two UAVs, the Rmax and NPS SUAV, was captured and 
transferred to the PVNT display.  Figure 26 on the next page shows the two captured 
images projected onto a map display.  Due to technical difficulties with the NPS SUAV, 
no live image was projected.  Instead the white content shown is due to data from the 
PELCO transmitter that occurs when no video data is available. 
The experiment successfully demonstrated that two images could be sent to the 
PVNT workstation and projected onto the map display at 1.5 fps for each image.  
However, the geo-location accuracy was poor due to lack of and, in most cases, 
unavailability of timely position and camera orientation data for the UAVs.   
Another observation was made concerning the image viewed on the screen.  We 
noticed that screen resolution collapses near the apex of the viewing cone.  As the image 
is squeezed into a smaller area on the screen, less pixels are available to display it and 
clarity is lost.  While the cone map projection is a good idea, it can not replace the 
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C. TNT EXPERIMENT 06-4 
Similar to experiment TNT 06-3, the FMCSS overarching objective for TNT 06-4 
was to support flight coordination, feature identification, and target location for multiple 
SUAVs.  TNT 06-4 had three objectives:  
• “Fly-the-Sensor:” Test the ability of the FMCSS to control the sensor of 
the NPS SUAV in order to facilitate feature and target tracking  
• Image Stabilization:  Integrate the Sarnoff VICE system with the FMCSS 
in order to evaluate the ability of the mosaic capability to supply 
electronically stabilized imagery to down stream search, feature 
identification, and target tracking systems. 
• Message Standardization:  Test message format and integrate telemetry 
in order to receive data and provide mission support services for all 
UAVs. 
The discussion that follows will cover the salient portions of first two 
objectives35.   
1. General Setup and Schematic 
The general setup for TNT 06-4 is similar to TNT 06-3 with the exception that 
only one interface machine is required.  Figure 27 illustrates the FMCSS schematic with 











                                                 
35 Full technical details and thorough description of the experiment can be found in the final report 










































   
Figure 27.   TNT 03-4 FMCSS Schematic Diagram 
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2. Fly the Sensor 
Figure 4 shows video returned from the NPS SUAV while tracking a dark colored 
HMMWV.  Prior to this a white SUV acted as the moving target but could not be seen on 
the white road background.  A UDP interface between the SUAV, GCS and PVNT in the 
MCS provided telemetry from the SUAV and sensor way point as well as control 
commands in other directions.   
The HMMWV appears only as a dot in Figure 28 indicating the need for better 
resolution.  Also noted was the large variation in background view orientation.  The 




Figure 28.   First Tracking HMMWV on Generals Road 
 
It should also be emphasized that spot tracking software that follows the black 
feature along the white road was not tracking this vehicle.  Instead sensor way points 
were entered on simulated imagery through PVNT along the road at two to three second 
intervals in order to keep visual contact with the vehicle.  The images above showed 
considerable buffeting and frame-to-frame reorientation.  
A better example of the tracking problem is shown in the following five frame 
clip.  The vehicle passes three trees in the upper right edge of window 2 shown below.  It 
is only a small black dot but can be easily seen.  For this segment the SUAV is moving in 
a slow arc around a road point.  The first three frames are stable with the camera rotating 
slowly around a point close to the tree in the lower center. 
The fifth frame however shows a jump and the three trees suddenly show up close 
to the lower right of the frame.  The target is not viewable in this frame.  In window six 
target 
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the camera is reoriented toward the lower part of the road, the three trees move up and the 
target vehicle is again in view. 
 
   
 
Figure 29.   Second Tracking of HMMWV on Generals Road 
 
When the features in window two to six are extracted to perform a flat image 
rotation and translation, the features did not quite match due to the lack of elevation and 
projection correction.  However, they did match well enough to perform a velocity 
calculation.  A similar calculation could be performed by estimating the target 
coordinates in each frame separately and performing the velocity calculation 
mathematically.  However, this will require the points to control the camera motion and 





Figure 30.   Target Distance Traveled 
 
The experiments conducted were a qualitative test of the ability to fly the sensor 
and this was accomplished.  Quantitative measurements should be taken in follow-on 
experiments to measure the accuracies and identify correctable sources of inaccuracies.  
A vehicle outfitted with GPS capable of recording its location is recommended so that 
comparisons with PVNT generated points can be made. 
3. Image Stabilization   
The goal for this experiment was to verify the compatibility of the VICE mosaic 
image stability software with the PVNT interface software in order to demonstrate 
equipment readiness for electronically stabilized image investigations.  The CR_Interface 
was able to perform mosaic screen capture and synchronize telemetry along with the 
captured image.  The CR_Interface fixed window proved adequate to capture potential 
target windows and the BMP format conversion and data transfer to the PVNT down 
stream processor was accomplished without overloading the VICE machine.  Sufficinet 
screen space on the VICE machine was also verified that it could perform adequate 
feature identification.  Overall, video and telemetry interfaces where completed so that 
the VICE workstation acted like a PC_Interface device with live video presented on a 
mosaic screen36.   
                                                 
36 A detailed description of the technical modifications is provided in final report entitled: TNT-06-4 




Figure 26 below shows a screen capture of the VICE mosaic on the right with 
image trail consisting of six screen image captures on the left.  Notice that the mosaic 
tends to wander and fill the large screen on the right side.  The trigger for a new mosaic 
was a full screen.  The VICE software can be set to begin a new mosaic frame every 
second, but this feature could not be automatically set on the available version and 
instead was emulated by hand command.  A blow up of the windows captured at a one 
second intervals shows that a fairly well centered picture could be extracted consistently.  

























Figure 32.   Trail Images Captured 
 
A considerable amount of noise in the form of artifacts was observed in the six 
one second snapshots shown in Figure 32.  A larger mosaic snapshot is shown below in 
Figure 33 consisting of 10 to 30 slide mosaics.  Geographic stability was achieved 
making this a good technique for viewing; however artifacts are still present in areas 
where the frames were overlaid.  Visual inspection shows considerable distortion in the 











Figure 33.   Large Mosaic 
 
When converted to black and white and transferred to PVNT a typical picture 
looks like the one shown in Figure 34 below.  Although line artifacts are visible over the 
whole picture they are noticeably accentuated in the Mosaic overlay region.  Further 
testing will be required to determine if a computer can actually get any advantage out of 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS  
A. SUMMARY 
UAS large and small are here to stay.  Since the beginning of the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT) in 2001, the U.S. DoD alone has nearly quadrupled its funding for UAS 
making it a two billion dollar per year industry.  By 2010 this figure is predicted to grow 
to three billion dollars.  The historical and predicted future relevance of UAS was 
presented in this thesis.  Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (STAR) 
missions remain the predominant missions that military commanders request UAS to 
perform.  Many other areas including electronic attack (EA), Strike and Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), Communication Relays, and Combat Search and Rescue 
(CSAR) are also expected to be increasingly performed by UAS.  
Several technology gaps, particularly those related to STAR missions, were 
identified.  The need for better visual display technologies, better interoperability with 
other systems and the need to consider the operational support needs over the total life of 
the system were addressed.  A function versus mission table was provided that listed 
known functions necessary for mission success.  It is hoped that this matrix can serve as a 
guide in the development of future flight and mission control support systems (FMCSS).   
An alternative to the current paradigm of designing UAS around the concept of 
putting a pilot’s brain in the cockpit was offered.  The concept of “fly-the-sensor” was 
introduced as a new philosophy to use when designing UAS.  The concept shifts the 
emphasis off the pilot and recommends designs centered on flying the sensor instead of 
the UAV.  As technology advances allowing more vehicle autonomy, this concept will 
likely permit designs that are less manpower intensive. 
Several potential technology solutions were presented that offer the possibility to 
enhance the likelihood of mission success by reducing the cognitive load on human 
operators.  The thesis presented the argument that designers can achieve more bang for 
the buck by expending resources on software solutions over computer or airframe 
hardware solutions.  The rapid rate at which of computer hardware technology is 
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advancing has opened up new possibilities for software solutions to perform functions 
that are currently being handled by humans.   
Finally, two field experiments were conducted to test the feasibility of four 
potential technology solutions as they pertain to the design of a SUAS FMCSS.  The first 
experiment tested a program that allows synchronized image playback for MCS 
operators.  The objective of this experiment was to give the operator more flexibility by 
being able to review video instantly instead of needing to retrack an area that was 
previously observed by the UAV camera.  The second experimented tested a program 
that will allow video from two UAVs to be displayed simultaneously on one monitor.  
This technology may eventually enable an operator to effectively control multiple UAVs 
thus reducing the operator to UAV ratio.  The third experiment tested the “fly-the-sensor” 
concept.  The experiment demonstrated that a target could be tracked by telling the sensor 
where to point as opposed to flying the UAV and then pointing the sensor.  And finally 
the last experiment tested the possibility of integrating a commercial software product 
into the MCS to provide image stability.  By reducing the jitter of displayed images the 
cognitive load on the mission payload operator can be reduced and enable the 
identification of targets to be accomplished faster.   
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AVO Air Vehicle Operator MAE Medium Altitude Endurance
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics MAV Micro Air Vehicle
AOI Area of Interest MCS Mission Control Station
AOR Area of Responsibility MPO Mission Payload Operator
B/W Black and White NRT Near Real Time
BA Battlespace Awareness NPS Naval Postgraduate School
BDA Battle Damage Assessment NDIA National Defense Industrial Association 
BW Bandwidth MTI Moving Target Indicator
C2 Command and Control NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 
C2 Command and Control OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
COCOM Combatant Commander NLOS Non-Line of Sight
COP Common Operational Picture VICE Video Imagery Capability Enhancement
CoT Cursor-on-Target OPTEMPO Operational Tempo
CR Camp Roberts NCW Network Centric Warfare
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue NOHD Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance
DoD Department of Defense PDA Personal Digital Assistant
EA Electronic Attack QDR Quadrenial Defense Review
EM Electromagnetic PVNT Perspective View Nascent Technology
EO Electro-Optical RADAR Radio Detection and Ranging
FA Force Application SA Situational Awareness
FL Focused Logistics SECDEF Secretary of Defense
FLOT Forward Line of Troops SUAV Small Unmanned Air Vehicle
FMCSS Flight and Mission Control Support System ROE Rules of Engagement
FOV Field of View RF Radio Frequency
FP Force Protection SUAS Small Unmanned Aerial System
Gbps Giga Bit per second SOCOM Special Operations Command
GCS Ground Control Station SEAD/DEAD
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense/
Destruction of Enemy Air Defense
GIG Global Information Grid STANAG Standardization Agreement
GWOT Global War on Terror SME Subject Matter Expert
HALE High Altitude Long Endurance STAR Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconaissance
HIL Human in the Loop TCS Tactical Control System
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle TOC Tactical Operations Center
IADS Integrated Air Defense System TNT Tactical Network Topology
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers TUAS Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
IPL Integrated Priority List TIPS Tactical Image Processing Software 
IR Infared TCP/IP Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Missile UA Unmanned Aircraft
JFC Joint Force Commander UAS Unmanned Aerial System
JSRC Joint Search and Rescue Center UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
LOS Line-of-Sight UDP User Datagram Protocol
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